



DAMNED IF IT DOESN’T AND DAMNED IF IT DOES:  
THE EUROPEAN COURT’S MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 







This Article argues that the European Court of Human Rights’s 
use of the margin of appreciation in cases involving religious sym-
bols can be seen as the Court’s status-seeking mechanism, whose 
application varies with the status of states, and the social status 
and distance of religious symbols from mainstream social norms. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s self-restraint through the margin of 
appreciation, due to the informational function of law and status 
concerns, its procedures and decision have mobilizing effects upon 
third party interveners, states, groups, and “loyalists”, with, at 
times, adverse effects. The mobilization of the states as third-party 
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interveners in front of the Court creates a structural misbalance un-
favorable to the individual applicants, while intervention of non-
state third parties in the Court’s procedures defers the alignment of 
socially controversial religious symbols, such as the wearing of the 
burqa with mainstream norms. Mobilization of states, groups and 
loyalists in the wake of the Court’s deliberations decreases overall 
social pluralism, since states and various groups benefit from using 
litigation in front of the Court for purposes of the preemptive de-
fense of the status quo and the creation of an emerging consensus, 
norm-entrepreneurship and strategic cause-legitimization (in the 
case of groups), and “mobilization of loyalties” (in the case of “loy-
alists”). 
As democracy implicitly rests on the social norms of past gen-
erations, disputes over the presence of headscarves, turbans, 
crucifixes, and burqas in various spaces are but minor symptoms 
of the growing anxieties over the institutional and social willing-
ness and capabilities of democracies to manage pluralism caused 
by social and demographic change. This article suggests that the 
European Court of Human Rights is even less willing and well-
equipped to deal with the phenomenon of increased religious di-
versity. The Court is “damned if it doesn’t and damned if it does”: 
both its self-restraint via the margin of appreciation and more ac-
tivist decisions can do more harm than good, inflame what are con-
trollable low-intensity social tensions, and create troubles where 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Court of Human Rights’s (“the Court”) juris-
prudence on Article 9 freedom of religion of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (“the Convention”)1 is modest, but only 
likely to grow, given steady increases in religious diversity.2  With-
in this jurisprudence, with two notable exceptions,3 the Court dis-
played a considerable deference toward Council of Europe (“CoE”) 
member states’ regulations of religious symbols by relying on the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation,4 particularly in cases in-
                                                   
1  See Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (codifying 
“the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”).  
2  For a discussion of reasons behind the Court’s modest Article 9 jurispru-
dence, see, e.g., Tom Lewis, What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, 
and the Margin of Appreciation, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 395, 397–401 (2007) (arguing 
that the Court accords low priority to Article 9 because religion has little relevance 
for the effective operation of political democracy, the Court’s primary concern); 
Aaron R. Petty, Religion, Conscience, and Belief in the European Court of Human 
Rights, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 807, 825–44 (2016) (discussing various histori-
cal, conceptual, and doctrinal reasons behind the Court’s reluctance to engage 
with the question of religion); Asim Jusic, Constitutional Changes and the Incremen-
tal Reductions of Collective Religious Freedom in Hungary, 10 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 
199, 200–01 and accompanying notes (2016) (arguing that the varied social back-
ground of CoE states and the consequent lack of a coherent methodology for de-
ciding freedom of religion cases has hindered the development of Article 9 juris-
prudence).  
3  See Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) [hereinafter 
Ahmet Arslan], http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237 
[https://perma.cc/3QDY-2XPC] (holding that the punishment of persons partici-
pating in a public parade wearing distinct religious clothing violates Article 9); 
Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, 
36516/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013) [hereinafter Eweida], 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115881 [https://perma.cc/HDB6-KWT4] 
(finding the prohibition of wearing of religious necklace to be a violation of rights 
under Article 9).  In Eweida the Court held there is disproportionate interference 
with individual religious belief once the private employer, an airline company, 
requests an employee (Eweida), to remove a discreet cross; but no interference 
when the public employer, the state hospital, requested virtually the same of the 
second applicant (Chaplin).  Another possible exception includes Hamidović v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 57792/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-5933801-7581160 
[https://perma.cc/GKN2-96R5] (finding that state authorities exceeded the mar-
gin of appreciation when a member of the Wahhabi/Salafi Islamic group was 
fined for contempt of court after refusing to remove his skullcap while witnessing, 
and the fine was later commuted to imprisonment).  The latter judgment is not 
final at the time of finalization of this article.  
4  The margin of appreciation is basically a doctrine of judicial restraint de-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
  
2018] The European Court’s Margin of Appreciation 565 
volving Muslim women.5  When using the margin of appreciation 
in these cases, the Court has rarely balanced the interests of states 
and the rights of individuals.  Rather, as in many other instances, 
the Court has relied upon the margin of appreciation to please the 
states vigorously and with zeal.6   
Such zealousness was at times too much for scholars, who re-
sponded mostly with criticism to the Court’s interpretation of the 
margin of appreciation in three groundbreaking cases involving re-
ligious symbols: Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, where the Court supported 
the Turkish prohibition of headscarves worn by a university stu-
dent on account of political threats to Turkey’s constitutional secu-
larism;7 Lautsi v. Italy Grand Chamber decision, which, contrary to 
                                                   
veloped by the Court to defer to the judgment of the state in evaluating factual 
situations and applying the provisions of international human rights treaties. It 
looms large in cases involving the freedom of religion.  See YUTAKA ARAI, THE 
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR, 2–3, 92–99 (2001) (providing background infor-
mation on the margin of appreciation doctrine).  Its use by the Court is usually 
traced back to a historical case, see Handyside v. UK App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. para. 49 (1976) (“The domestic margin of appreciation . . . goes hand in hand 
with a European supervision.”).  Under various guises and names, the margin of 
appreciation is used in multiple international decision-making bodies and courts, 
and its application is marked by the judicial deference to authorities and the foggy 
doctrinal contours.  See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doc-
trine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 909–10 (2005) (detailing charac-
teristics of the margin of appreciation doctrine). 
5  For a general critical overview of the Court’s unfavorable treatment of reli-
gious symbols, see generally Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In 
Search of a European Answer, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2669 (2009). For a discussion on 
the application of the margin of appreciation in cases involving Muslim women, 
see, e.g., Tom Lewis, supra note 2, at 405–09 (detailing why the Court gave leeway 
to state restrictions on religious expression by Muslim women in Turkey); Melanie 
Adrian, The Principled Slope: Religious Freedom and the European Court of Human 
Rights, 45 RELIG. ST. SOC’Y 174 (2017) (examining the Court’s application of the 
margin of appreciation in four cases involving headscarves and veil in public 
spaces).  
6  For a critique of the use of margin of appreciation as a method of the 
Court’s avoidance of conflict with the states, see Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appre-
ciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 851–53 
(1999) (describing how the Court’s “consensus doctrine enjoys considerable sup-
port among legal commentators,” and why this support is flawed).  Even those 
sympathetic to the margin of appreciation do not find Court’s application of the 
doctrine faultless.  See generally Dominic McGoldrick, A Defence of the Margin of 
Appreciation and an Argument for Its Application by the Human Rights Committee, 65 
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 21 (2016). 
7  See generally Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173 (2005) [hereinafter 
Sahin], http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70956 [https://perma.cc/PU23-
X6YW].  For a voluminous literature criticizing the Sahin judgment, see Rorive, su-
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the holding of the court’s Second Chamber in Lautsi v. Italy , de-
ferred to the traditional display of the Catholic cross in Italian pub-
lic schools;8 and in SAS v. France, a case in which the Court found 
that the margin of appreciation and the requirements of “living to-
gether” justified the 2011 French law banning the burqa (full-face 
veil) in all public spaces.9 
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is a result of the 
Court’s understandable preference for conflict aversion, a manifes-
tation of the Court’s partially secondary and supervisory role in 
the face of pluralism of state interests, and the variety evident 
within states’ institutional and social backgrounds.10  While its 
positive sides, doctrinal faults and negative impact on the general 
duty of international human rights tribunals to provide meaningful 
protection to those in need are well covered,11 there are very few 
                                                   
pra note 5, at n.61. 
8  See generally Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) [here-
inafter Lautsi I], http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-95589 
[https://perma.cc/DWA5-S6MY]; see also Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 
2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (2011) [hereinafter Lautsi Grand Chamber], 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104040 [https://perma.cc/K33G-FGGY] 
(finding that the state-installed cross in a public school in Italy was a passive his-
torical symbol which the state is free to erect). For a critique of the application of 
the margin of appreciation in the Lautsi Grand Chamber decision, see generally 
Giulio Itzcovich, One, None and One Hundred Thousand Margins of Appreciations: 
The Lautsi Case, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2013). 
9  See generally S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341 (2014) [hereinafter 
SAS], http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466 [https://perma.cc/EXL3-
B532].  For criticism of the French prohibitions of burqa in public space, see, e.g., 
Armin Steinbach, Burqas and Bans: The Wearing of Religious Symbols under the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights, 4 CAMB. J. INT’L & COMP. L 29 (2015) (examining 
the French burqa ban in light of the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
wearing of religious symbols and arguing that the margin of appreciation does 
not justify the expansion of legitimate aims of restriction allowed under Article 9 
of the Convention); Myriam Hunter-Henin, Living Together in an Age of Religious 
Diversity: Lessons from Baby Loup and SAS, 4 OXFORD J. L. & RELIG. 94 (2015) (criti-
cizing the use of the margin of appreciation in SAS but finding that the judgment 
takes a balanced approach that charts new paths for renegotiating the place of re-
ligion in Europe).  
10  See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 846 (“The percolation of the doctrine into 
areas devoid of security consideration . . .  reflected an altogether different philos-
ophy, one which is based on notions of subsidiarity and democracy and which 
significantly defers to the wishes of each society to maintain its unique values and 
address its particular needs.”).  
11  For a voluminous list of literature discussing the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, see Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts: 
Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights—Or Neither?, 79 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, n. 46 (2016); McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 37–38 (detailing 
critiques about the margin of appreciation doctrine). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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studies that provide an in-depth discussion of links between the 
causes behind the Court’s use of the margin of appreciation in 
cases involving religious symbols, the Court’s behavior and the so-
cial consequences of the two.12  Here, this link is discussed from the 
interdisciplinary perspective of the sociology of international law 
and tribunals13 and the sociology of law and religion.14  It is hoped 
that such an interdisciplinary approach will provide novel perspec-
tives on the macro- and micro-interdependencies between the in-
ternational tribunals, state behavior, and the legal and non-legal 
regulation of social processes affected by religion as a social fact. 
Several arguments are presented.  Overall, the margin of ap-
preciation can be seen as the Court’s status-seeking mechanism, 
whose application varies with the status of states, and the social 
status and distance of religious symbols from the mainstream so-
cial norms. Irrespective of its restraint through the margin of ap-
preciation, due to the informational function of law and concerns 
regarding status, the Court’s procedures have mobilizing effects 
upon third party interveners, states, religious and non-religious 
groups, and “loyalists,” with, at times, negative consequences.  The 
mobilization of the states as third-party interveners in front of the 
Court creates a structural misbalance unfavorable to the individual 
applicants, while intervention of non-state third parties in the 
Court’s procedures increases applicants’ social distance from the 
mainstream by deferring the alignment of socially controversial 
symbolic religious practices—such as burqas—with mainstream 
norms.  Mobilization of states, groups and loyalists prior to and in 
the aftermath of the Court’s deliberations decreases overall social 
                                                   
12  For exceptions, see Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 847 (arguing, without specif-
ically focusing on religious symbols, that minorities, including religious ones, are 
the main victims of the Court’s liberal use of the margin of appreciation); Lewis, 
supra note 2, at 409 (noting that the Court’s reliance on the margin of appreciation 
in the Sahin case resulted in a disregard of the individual circumstance and the 
behavior of the applicant).  
13  See Karen J. Alter et al., How Context Shapes the Authority of International 
Courts, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2016) (examining how the formal legal authori-
ty of international courts evolves into a de facto authority); see generally Mikael R. 
Madsen, Towards a Sociology of International Courts (Danish Nat’l Res. Found. Ctr. 
Excell. Int’l Cts., Working Paper No, 1, 2013) (analyzing international courts from 
the perspective of classical sociological theories). 
14  See James T. Richardson, The Sociology of Religious Freedom: A Structural and 
Socio-Legal Analysis, 67 SOC. RELIG. 271 (2006) (providing a structural and socio-
legal analysis which examines the historical, sociological, and cultural factors that 
explain the outcome of legal cases involving the religious freedom of minority 
groups).  
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pluralism, since states and various groups—religious and non-
religious alike—benefit, using the litigation in front of the Court for 
purposes of the preemptive defense of the status-quo and the crea-
tion of an emerging consensus (as in the case of high-status states 
promoting burqa ban across Europe), norm-entrepreneurship and 
strategic cause-legitimization (in the case of groups), and “the mo-
bilization of loyalties” (in the case of “loyalists”). 
This paper builds on and contributes to several strands of re-
search: literature on informational function of law and compliance 
with decisions of the international tribunals that generally lack co-
ercive power,15 previous research pointing out the relative ineffec-
tiveness and undesirable effects of international human rights 
norms,16 literature arguing that human rights treaties have mobiliz-
ing effects on domestic constituencies,17 and the sociology of law 
and religion.18  The main added value of the paper is twofold: First-
ly, it gives a sociological perspective of the relationship between 
the margin of appreciation as the expression of the Court’s status 
                                                   
15  See Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1043 (2005) (advancing the theory of “expressive adjudication” to explain 
compliance with decisions of the tribunals that lack the power of sanctions); Tom 
Ginsburg & Richard McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of 
International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004) (using a set of 
expressive theories of law to explain compliance with decisions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, which has no real power to independently impose sanc-
tions); Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2008) (theorizing that international tribunals that lack coercive 
power provide information that can be used to increase voluntary compliance 
with international law). 
16  See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 
YALE L. J. 1935 (2001) (supplying evidence that the ratification of human rights 
treaties by less democratic nations can lead to a worsening of the actual level of 
the protection of human rights); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, 
Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 
1373 (2005) (suggesting that, in the aftermath of accession to human rights treaties, 
governments occasionally decrease the effective level of the protection of human 
rights); Andrew T. Guzman & Katerina Linos, Human Rights Backsliding, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 603 (2014) (arguing that, in the aftermath of the attachment to inter-
national human rights norms and treaties, states that are otherwise strongly 
committed to human rights decrease the domestic protection of human rights). 
17  See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009). 
18  Treatment of minority religions in the Court was rarely in focus of the so-
ciologist of law. But see generally James T. Richardson & Jennifer Shoemaker, The 
European Court of Human Rights, Minority Religions, and the Social Construction of 
Religious Freedom, in THE CENTRALITY OF RELIGION IN SOCIAL LIFE 103–16 (Eileen 
Barker ed., 2008). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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concerns, the status of the CoE States, and states’ regulation of non-
mainstream religious symbols and social norms as domestic causes 
of mobilizations in the wake of the Court’s decisions.  Secondly, it 
highlights the undesirable effects of mobilizations of states, third 
party interveners, and domestic constituencies in the name of hu-
man rights. 
The organization of the paper is as follows.  The argument in 
Section 2 is that the Court’s own status concerns are the main rea-
son for the margin of appreciation being frequently used in cases 
involving religious symbols, and that, in using it, the Court differ-
entiates between high- and low-status states and high- and low-
status religious symbols and social norms.  Section 3 argues that 
the informational value of the Court’s decisions has mobilizing ef-
fects on states, groups, third party interveners in front of the Court, 
and, in addition, upon the “loyalists,” and lays out the downsides 
and negative effects of such mobilizations.  In light of arguments 
laid out in Section 2 and 3, Section 4 discusses implications, critical-
ly assesses the process of the Court’s sliding further toward the 
relativistic status-based considerations, and questions the Court’s 
willingness and capability to act as an arbiter in disputes involving 
religious symbols in societies marked by increasing religious di-
versity. 
 
2.  THE COURT’S STATUS AND THE MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION 
 
Somewhat like other international tribunals, the Court has no 
mechanism for direct enforcement of its decisions.19  Rather, the 
                                                   
19  Cf. Guzman, supra note 15, at 179 (“[W]hen a state loses before an interna-
tional tribunal, no formal legal structure exists to enforce the ruling. The assets of 
the noncompliant state will not be seized, nobody will be arrested, and the state 
will not even lose its ability to file complaints.”).  In the case of the Convention, in 
accordance with its Article 46, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers has 
the authority to supervise the execution of the Court’s judgments.  This Commit-
tee of Ministers consists of Ministers of Foreign of Affairs of 47 Council of Europe 
countries.  See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, About the Committee of Ministers (2016), 
http://www.coe.int/web/cm/about-cm [https://perma.cc/7G3Z-BPHJ] (“The 
Committee of Ministers also supervises the execution by member states of judg-
ments of the European Court of Human Rights.”).  Nevertheless, the ultimate 
power of execution of the Court’s judgments rests with the states themselves, and 
the 11,018 cases pending before the Committee of Ministers as of 2013 due to the 
lack of full compliance with and execution of the Court’s judgments by states 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
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practical impact of Court’s decisions relies to a large extent on the 
consent and the willingness of sovereign intermediaries (CoE 
states) to comply.  There are behavioral and doctrinal implications 
of this state of affairs: The Court recognized its own structural limi-
tations and developed the doctrine of judicial restraint, the margin 
of appreciation,20 which partially derives its justification from 19th 
century theories of state consent as a cornerstone of international 
law.21  In what follows, I discuss the Court’s strategic and tactical 
use of the margin of appreciation for the purpose of increasing its 
status in cases involving religious symbols. 
 
2.1.  The Court’s Status Concerns 
 
International tribunals have been studied in order to explain 
states’ compliance with their decisions in the absence of sanc-
tions.22  One theory is that international tribunals rely on the in-
                                                   
shows that the Court’s authority is in crisis.  See Mikael Madsen, The Challenging 
Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy to 
the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 173 Figure 6 
(2016) (displaying a rising number of cases before the Committee of Ministers 
since 1996). 
20  On the structural concept of the margin of appreciation, see George Letsas, 
Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 705, 706 (2006) 
(introducing a novel analysis of the margin of appreciation doctrine). 
21  See Susanna Mancini, The Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism 
Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 6, 25 (2010) 
(“[T]he doctrine of the margin of appreciation derives its justification primarily 
from the 19th century theories of state consensus . . . .”).  Theoretically, once the 
initial consent of states is secured, the international human rights tribunals can be 
considered as non-consensual mechanisms that have, at the very least, eroded the 
principle of the sovereign consent.  See Laurence Helfer, Nonconsensual Internation-
al Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 86–87 (2008) (describing nonconsensual in-
ternational lawmaking applied to human rights issues).  Practically, however, 
state consent still remains the cornerstone, as states can restrain the influence of 
international tribunals.  See Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 
747, 787 (2012) (“The lesson from the ICJ can be generalized to other tribunals. In 
one way or another, states cabin the influence of tribunals and preserve the central 
role of consent.”).  The relationship between consent and consensus is a vexed is-
sue, but for the purposes of this paper, following Dzehtsiarou, the term “Europe-
an consensus” means a continuously updated consent of States party to the Con-
vention.  See KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU, EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (2015) (defining “Eu-
ropean consensus”).  
22  See McAdams, supra note 15, at 1103, n. 196 (surveying literature finding a 
high level of state compliance with decisions of international tribunals); see also 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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formational function of their decisions and rulings in order to in-
fluence the behavior of states. The information they convey may 
assist the parties in resolving a dispute in a mutually acceptable 
way.  It may also inform the state parties to the cases, as well as 
third parties, on the violation of law, with potential reputational 
and reciprocal consequences for a state violator or potential viola-
tor, with a caveat that the (potential) violator, given lack of coer-
cive mechanisms, faces no immediate costs as a result of viola-
tion.23 
However, the Court claims its task is more ambitious because 
the Convention is a network of obligations that should be collec-
tively enforced by the CoE states.24  Although  the Court primarily 
decides upon disputes involving individuals and states, its deci-
sions, which, technically speaking, do not have an erga omnes effect, 
potentially have wider social effects, and the justices at the Court 
believe they do exert de facto influence well beyond the immediate 
dispute and affect the application of domestic law in similar cases 
across the CoE states.25 
                                                   
Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 15, at 1233–34 and 1310–11 (showing that, in 
spite of the lack of enforcement power, the International Court of Justice managed 
to secure a high rate of compliance with its decisions).  Additionally, see David S. 
Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L. J. 723, 725–26 (2009) 
(surveying literature on compliance with constitutional courts and informal tribu-
nals’ decisions in the absence of state sanctions). 
23  See Guzman, supra note 15, at 180–82 (detailing the “two kinds of infor-
mation dissemination that might allow a tribunal to influence states.”). 
24  See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No 5310/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 239 
(1978), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57506 [https://perma.cc/3JRD-
64UE] (“[T]he Convention . . . creates . . . a network of mutual, bilateral undertak-
ings, objective obligations which . . . benefit from a ‘collective enforcement’.”). 
25  Formally speaking, judgments of the Court are only binding for the states 
involved in the case.  See Council of Europe, supra note 1, art. 46(1) (“The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in cases 
to which they are parties.”).  However, the Court has stated on multiple occasions 
that its “judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought before the 
Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted 
by the Convention . . .. Although the primary purpose of the Convention system is 
to provide individual relief, its mission is also to determine issues on public-
policy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising the general standards of 
protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout 
the community of Convention States.”  See Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R 
199, para. 26, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61263 
[https://perma.cc/Z4HU-RF5P]. For a nuanced discussion on the Court’s deci-
sions as a potential source of de facto erga omnes obligations, see Dean Spielmann, 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Systems of 
Europe, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1231, 
1246 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 2012) (“. . .even though the judgments 
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In light of these claims, this article starts from three premises: 
Firstly, in the absence of direct enforcement mechanisms, the Court 
continuously employs informational (expressive) influence of its 
decisions to increase its authoritative status (a de facto authority).26  
Secondly, when it comes to cases involving religious symbols, the 
Court interacts with internal state-religion relations, within which 
states regulate religions and their symbols according to their social 
status as measured by the distance from the mainstream.  The 
mainstream is occupied, formally or informally, by the most social-
ly prevalent norms and/or religions, and followed by other norms 
and religions whose social status decline proportionally to their 
distance from the mainstream.27  Thirdly, as states and their social 
backgrounds differ, in order to increase its own authoritative status 
the Court ranks states into categories of “high-status states,” to 
whom the Court grants greater privileges (and wider margins of 
appreciation), and “low-status states,” to whom the Court grants 
fewer privileges (and narrower margins of appreciation).  The priv-
ileges among states are attributable to who states are, and not nec-
essarily to what they do (i.e. state performance).28 
                                                   
of the ECtHR do not, legally speaking, have erga omnes effect, the interpretation 
chosen by the ECtHR in a particular case has a de facto relevance for the subse-
quent application of the domestic law in all similar pending or parallel cases”); 
Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: 
Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77, 78 (2014) (“Nevertheless, 
many [international courts’] rulings have—or purport to have—erga omnes ef-
fects. . ..”). 
26  The expressive power of law lies in its ability to have effect and occasion-
ally generate compliance by what it says and what sort of social information it 
provides independent of sanctions.  See McAdams, supra note 15 at 1045–49 
(providing theoretical explanations as to why people obey laws and courts).  For 
the purposes of this article, the authoritative status of the Court means its de facto 
authority.  It is more than merely a state’s compliance with the Court’s instruc-
tions, as it includes interaction with wider social norms, and is independent of the 
question of the legitimacy of the Court. Cf. Alter et al., supra note 13, at 7 (explain-
ing that de facto authority of international courts “has two key components—(1) 
recognizing an obligation to comply with court rulings and (2) engaging in mean-
ingful action pushing toward giving full effect to those rulings.”). 
27  Compare Richardson, supra note 14, at 277 (Table 1).  Richardson ranks reli-
gions in a vertical hierarchy, whereas in this work religions and social norms are 
placed on a horizontal scale.  
28  The language of status is implicit in descriptions of the margin of appreci-
ation since, when relying on the margin of appreciation, the Court gives weight to 
national interest not because of the arguments in dispute, but out of respect for 
national governments—that is, not because of what but because of who.  See TOR-
INGE HARBO, THE FUNCTION OF PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS IN EUROPEAN LAW 70 
(2015).  Prior works have relied on the concept of reputation rather than status to 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
  
2018] The European Court’s Margin of Appreciation 573 
The Court can increase its own status by using various judicial 
tactics, of which the margin of appreciation is arguably one.29  
However, by doing so, the Court’s authoritative status remains un-
certain relative to that of states, as the Court remains captive to the 
threats of non-compliance, including the ultimate threat of retalia-
tory exit (e.g., the disgruntled state(s) leaving the Convention as a 
result of disagreement with Court’s decisions and jurisdiction).30  
                                                   
explain Court’s behavior.  See Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of 
Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 115, 116 and note 1 (2011) (“The ECHR does not 
have an effective mechanism to enforce its judgments. . . In order to obtain higher 
compliance rates with its judgments, including those that enable it to promote its 
preferences the ECHR seeks to increase its reputation .”).  While reputation, sta-
tus, and legitimacy are often indistinguishable, the distinction between reputation 
and status is that reputation rests on differences in quality or past and present 
performance and observable behavior, while status captures differences in privi-
leges not related to performance.  See Alessandro Piazza & Fabrizio Castellucci, 
Status in Organization and Management Theory, 40 J. MGMT. 287, 292–93 (2014) and 
the literature cited therein (“. . .reputation captures differences in quality or merit 
generating performance-based rewards, status captures differences in agreed-on 
social ranks generating privileges not related to performance.”).  Status, for the 
purposes of this article, means higher or lower legal privileges that reflect power 
differences among states, and also among social actors within states, and are only 
partially related to performance.  Irrespective of the widespread use of the con-
cept of status in the social sciences and the slow march towards non-
consensualism in international law, the consent view based on a principle of sov-
ereign equality is still a dominant (though not uncontested) paradigm in interna-
tional law scholarship, and few recent works have systematically questioned its 
continued relevance and attempted to analyze international law using the concept 
of status.  See John J. Chung, Customary International Law as Explained by Status In-
stead of Contract, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 609 (2012) (arguing that the status-
oriented theory, rather than the predominant consent/contract view, offers a bet-
ter explanation of the formation and functioning of customary international law); 
Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 
108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014) (discussing the gradual decline of consent as a corner-
stone of international law); Armin Steinbach, The Trend Towards Non-
Consensualism in Public International Law: A (Behavioural) Law and Economics Per-
spective, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 643 (2016) (exploring the application of behavioral eco-
nomics and rational choice theory to formats of non-consensualism). 
29  See Dothan, supra note 28, at 122–33 (discussing various judicial tactics the 
Court uses to increase its reputation). 
30  As to threats of exiting the Convention, British political elites, including 
prime ministers, have protested that the Court’s judgments are damaging to Brit-
ish interests and sovereignty, and have argued that the United Kingdom should 
leave the Convention.  Insiders criticized this position, arguing that leaving the 
Convention is harmful to the state’s international standing, and unnecessary giv-
en its ability to restrict the impact of the Convention.  See Anushka Asthana & 
Rowena Mason, UK Must Leave European Convention on Human Rights, Says Theresa 
May, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leave-european-
convention-on-human-rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum 
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Examples discussed below aim to show how, in cases involving re-
ligious symbols, the Court’s application of the margin of apprecia-
tion varies with the status of the state. 
 
2.2.  High-Status States and the Expansion of Compliance 
 
Whereas the reputation of a state is dependent on its perfor-
mance as measured by human rights standards, the high status of 
the state is marked by the privileges it enjoys as the party in spite 
of its performance.  The aftermath of France’s 2004 prohibition of 
religious attire (turbans and headscarves) in schools illustrates the 
impact of the status of a state on its treatment in the Court.  Once a 
group of French Sikh and Muslim pupils affected by the prohibi-
tion addressed the Court, the Court held that an application was 
inadmissible, as it fell under the margin of appreciation enjoyed by 
French state.31  Deliberating on the same issue at the request of a 
French Sikh pupil—Bikramjit Singh—the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee (UNHRC) found that a prohibition disproportionally, 
and without a real explanation, violated an individual’s right to 
manifest religion.32  However, France simply refused to implement 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/Z87U-UGHX].   
31   Aktas v. France, App. No. 43563/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237 
[https://perma.cc/Y3Y7-5UCM]; Bayrak v. France, App. No. 14308/08, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237 
[https://perma.cc/A39T-TBCA]; Gamaleddyn v. France, App. No. 18527/08, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237 
[https://perma.cc/9UBC-R9Q4]; Ghazal v. France, App. No. 29134/08, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237 
[https://perma.cc/JB4J-FLQH]; Jasvir Singh v. France, App. No. 25463/08, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237 
[https://perma.cc/L3TH-82YK]; Ranjit Singh v. France, App. No. 27561/08, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237 
[https://perma.cc/AQ2W-M34H] (holding that all applications were inadmissi-
ble).  
32  H.R. Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, par-
agraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (106th session) concerning Communication No. 1852/2008, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008 (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=CCPR/C/106/D/185
2/2008 [https://perma.cc/B8RH-233Z].In the Mann Singh case, the Court similar-
ly declared inadmissible the application of a practicing Sikh required to remove 
his turban for identity photographs for a driver’s license.  See Mann Singh v 
France, App. No. 24479/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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the decision of the UNHRC.33  Conscious of this development, the 
Court did not seek to improve its status by means of aligning its 
opinion with the UNHRC.  Rather, the Court perceived France’s 
defiance in the face of the UNHRC as a threat that its future deci-
sion will not be complied with by a state which the Court considers 
its ally, consequently negatively affecting the Court’s status.34  For 
this reason, relying on the margin of appreciation, the Court later 
continued its previous policy and supported the French general 
ban of burqas in public spaces35 and the almost general prohibition 
of headscarves in the workplace.36 
The high-status states seldom endanger the Court’s status 
                                                   
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-89848 [https://perma.cc/979Q-2U76].  
However, The UNHRC, deliberating on the request of Mann Singh on a virtually 
identical claim (identity photographs for a passport), again in opposition to the 
Court, later found that such a measure, without explanation, is not necessary for 
guaranteeing public safety, and violates an individual’s right to manifest his reli-
gion as guaranteed by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights.  See H.R. Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 
5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (108th session) concerning Communication No. 1928/2010 
(July 8-26, 2013), http://undocs.org/CCPR/C/108/D/1928/2010 
[https://perma.cc/4HHT-2RQ5] at 347-359.  Though the decisions (“Views”) of 
the UNHRC are technically not binding judgments, they arguably still have legal 
consequences, as the States who are parties to the Optional Protocol of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have an obligation to take them 
into consideration in good faith.  On the relevance of the UNHRC Views in three 
cases involving Sikh religious symbols, see Nikolaos Sitaropoulos, States are Bound 
to Consider the UN Human Rights Committee’s Views in Good Faith, OXFORD HUM. 
RTS. HUB BLOG (Mar. 11, 2015), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/states-are-bound-to-
consider-the-un-human-rights-committees-views-in-good-faith/ 
[https://perma.cc/MXP6-SBCX].  To illustrate the influence of the UNHRC’s 
opinions, consider that U.S. federal courts have held that the UNHRC’s opinions 
represent the persuasive authority for purposes of interpreting the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. David Sloss, Using International Law to En-
hance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (2006).  
33  On France’s refusal to consider and implement the UNHRC’s views in 
cases involving Sikh religious symbols, see Sitaropoulos, supra note 32.  For a de-
tailed discussion of the different treatment of Sikh religious symbols in French 
residence and identity documents and in schools by the Court and the UNHRC, 
see McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 46-52.  
34  See Dothan, supra note 28, at 135 (finding that the Court’s credibility suf-
fers great damage if the high-reputation state threatens to refuse compliance with 
the Court’s decision).  
35  Esther Erlings, ‘The Government Did Not Refer to It’: SAS v. France and Or-
dre Public at the European Court of Human Rights, 16 MELB. J. INT’L L. 587, 606 & 
n.124 (2015).  
36  Ebrahimian v. France, App. No. 64846/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158878 [https://perma.cc/R93M-W5RQ].  
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through explicit or implicit threats of non-compliance for a simple 
reason: as is often pointed out, through mutual understanding and 
the occasional exchange of arguments, the practices of high-status 
states and the Court eventually align in such a way as to confirm 
the Court’s authority.37   
However, a closer look at the process of increasing the Court’s 
authoritative status reveals that, at least when it comes to regula-
tion of religion, this is a process in which the high-status states are, 
in fact, directing the Court.  Consider the flow of cases emanating 
from Switzerland, some of which involved religious symbols.  In 
Dahlab v. Switzerland, the issue was whether firing a teacher who 
insisted on wearing a headscarf while working in a primary school 
in Switzerland violated her freedom of religion.  During the pro-
ceedings, the teacher, Ms. Dahlab, pointed to the fact that she had 
been working with a headscarf for more than five years prior to be-
ing fired with no disturbance to the religious harmony in the 
school composed of a wide range of nationalities accustomed to 
diversity and tolerance, and without complaints from pupils or 
parents.  The Court took note of Dahlab’s prior conversion from 
Catholicism to Islam and, unable to find empirical evidence of the 
impact of her behavior on others, felt compelled to engage theolog-
ical and sociological considerations, arguing that: 
The Court accepts that it is very difficult to assess the im-
pact that a powerful external symbol such as the wearing of 
a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and re-
ligion of very young children . . . it cannot be denied out-
right that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind 
of proselytizing effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed 
on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran 
and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square 
with the principle of gender equality.  It therefore appears 
difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf 
with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above 
all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a 
democratic society must convey to their pupils.38 
                                                   
37  See, e.g., Madsen, supra note 19, at 164–66 (discussing the interplay be-
tween the Court and the French judicial and political elites, which eventually, ac-
cording to Madsen, resulted in the Court’s extensive authority in France).  
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In the aftermath of this inadmissibility decision largely based 
on the margin of appreciation, the Court later also declared as in-
admissible a challenge to the 2009 Swiss constitutional amendment 
which, after a controversial popular referendum, prohibited the 
building of minarets, arguing that the applicants could not claim to 
be the victims of a violation of the Convention.39  The fact of a 
popular referendum and constitutional amendment—an ultimate 
signal of the prevalent social consensus—likely emboldened the 
Court to continue supporting Switzerland’s regulation of religious 
rights in the educational context, a policy which was precipitated 
by the Court’s decision in the Dahlab case.40 
Hence, while the Court might exhibit deference to high-status 
states due to a credible threat of non-compliance, this does not ful-
ly explain why the Court does this in such a consistent way and 
why it relies on sociological evaluations (as in Dahlab).  It appears 
that disputes involving a high-status state and religious symbols 
that are lacking in cultural intimacy with the mainstream social 
norms and that are of lower cultural status41 basically present an 
opportunity for the Court to enhance its own status.  The Court can 
use its discretion and resort to the margin of appreciation (or other 
procedural devices) as a way of disregarding the evidence and jus-
tifying results unfavorable to the members of non-mainstream and 
unpopular religions42 without risks and with prospective status 
gains for the following reasons:  On one hand, benevolently disre-
garding minority norms carries little risk to the Court’s status vis-
à-vis the high-status states.  On the other, the Court’s prospective 
status will increase, since in the future, high-status states will, if 
implicitly, act in compliance with Court’s jurisprudence, given that 
they have received a “blank check” in advance.   
                                                   
39  Ouardiri v. Switzerland, App. No. 65840/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105619 [https://perma.cc/FL2T-HP8M]; 
Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse & Others v. Switzerland, App. No. 66274/09, Eur. 
Ct. H.R (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105618 
[https://perma.cc/UJX8-KZU9].  
40  See, e.g., Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland, App. No. 29086/12, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2017) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-170346”]} 
[https://perma.cc/AWS6-9YLG] (holding that the mandatory mixed-gender 
swimming classes in schools override the religiously-grounded objections of Mus-
lim parents).  
41  The use of law increases with a decrease in cultural intimacy (relational 
distance).  DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 41 (1976).  
42  Judicial discretion abounds in cases involving socially unpopular reli-
gions.  See Richardson, supra note 14, at 287–88.  
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In sum, when state preference and signals of social consensus 
clearly label certain religious symbols as socially controversial and 
marginal, the Court is not just leaving a space of free action to the 
high-status states; it is preemptively increasing this space and its 
own status.43 
 
2.3.  Low-Status States and the Selective Margin of Appreciation 
 
What differentiates high- and low-status states is that the latter, 
for various reasons, cannot expect deference from the Court in 
most cases.  The reasons for the Court possibly considering a state 
to be low-status partially depend on state performance and (non-
)compliance with the Court’s decision(s).  Consider the following 
examples: Richardson has previously hypothesized that the Court 
has “double standards” and a tendency to find violations of Article 
9 in disputes involving Russia more frequently than it does with 
countries like France that enjoy deference under the margin of ap-
preciation.44  Since Russia has been consistently non-compliant 
with the Court’s decisions finding it in violation of Article 9,45 this 
likely led the Court to perceive it as a low-status state.  The pre-
dictability of Russia’s non-compliance made the impact of defiance 
upon the Court’s status negligible,46 whereas, as noted above, the 
Court perceives the impact of the French threat of non-compliance 
on the Court’s status as credible, due to its perception of France as 
its ally. 
However, poor performance which might motivate the Court 
to consider a state to be of low status does not explain significant 
variations in the Court’s behavior towards the low-status states.  
                                                   
43  In a sense, rulings of the Court are similar to rulings of other international 
tribunals: a means by which states can increase their influence and legitimize al-
ready-made decisions.  See Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-
Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 75 (2008) (“If, in-
stead of following controversy, scholars followed the litigants, they would be 
writing more about [international courts] involvement in private–public dispute 
adjudication, enforcement, and administrative review, and about how most of 
these rulings are exactly what states hoped for when they delegated authority to 
[international courts].”).  
44  James T. Richardson & Jennifer Shoemaker, supra note 18, at 106 & 114.  
45  James T. Richardson & Brian M. Lee, The Role of the Courts in the Social Con-
struction of Religious Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe, 39 REV. CENT. EAST EUR. 
L. 291, 302 (2014).  
46  Dothan, supra note 28, at 117 & 136. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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Even countries which, in the eyes of the Court, likely have a low 
status due to low compliance and a high number of cases lodged 
against them can temporarily enjoy a selective (topical) margin of 
appreciation similar to that of high-status states for reasons of who 
they are.  Between 1987 and 2001, the Court considered roughly 
2,400 cases filed against Turkey, finding at least one violation of the 
Convention in eighty-seven percent of those cases.  From the total 
number of all judgments finding violations of the Convention, 
around 1,700 were not fully implemented as of 2012, making Tur-
key one of the countries least compliant with the Court’s deci-
sions.47  Nevertheless, despite this record, and until recently, the 
Court consistently deferred to the Turkish constitutional principle 
of secularism whenever the dispute involved religious symbols.  
On the grounds of the margin of appreciation, the Court upheld 
the limitation on wearing headscarves on secondary school stu-
dents,48 university students attempting to finish their studies or 
make university identity photos,49 and university professors.50   
In the Sahin judgment, the Grand Chamber, echoing sociologi-
cal and theological considerations from the Dahlab case, clearly 
pointed out that the Court's  reliance on the margin of appreciation 
should be viewed in relation to who the state party to the case is 
and in the wider Turkish historical and social context, noting that: 
[T]he Court considers that, when examining the question of 
the Islamic headscarf the Turkish context, it must be borne 
in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, which is 
presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may 
have on those who choose not to wear it . . . in a country in 
which the majority of the population, while professing a 
strong attachment to the rights of women and a secular way 
of life, adhere to the Islamic faith.  Imposing limitations on 
freedom in this sphere may, therefore, be regarded as meet-
ing a pressing social need . . . this religious symbol has tak-
                                                   
47  Madsen, supra note 19, at 164 & n.166.  
48  Köse & 93 Others v. Turkey, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 339 (2006), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_2006-II.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F5DV-DLCQ]. 
49  Sahin, supra note 7; Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (1993), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-86170”]} 
[https://perma.cc/X6UD-LGUE]. 
50  Kurtulmus v. Turkey, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 297 (2006)., 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-88325”]} 
[https://perma.cc/K2HV-AWHQ].  
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en on political significance in Turkey in recent years. . . . 
there are extremist political movements in Turkey which 
seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols 
and conception of a society founded on religious precepts.51 
The Court’s generous use of the margin of appreciation in the 
case of religious symbols in Turkey can be likened only to the 
Court’s similar stance toward the regulation of religious symbols 
in France.52  This, however, does not imply that the Court has a 
consistent preference for secularism that is (or was) supposedly 
shared by Turkey and France.53  As the difference in the Court’s 
stance toward Turkey and France in the cases Ahmet Arslan v. Tur-
key and SAS v. France shows, for better or worse, the Court’s stance 
towards Turkey has changed. This likely happened due to political 
and social changes in the last decade.54  Both Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey 
and SAS v. France were based on similar facts—prohibition and/or 
punishment for wearing religious clothing and symbols in the pub-
lic space—but the outcomes differed.  According to the Court, the 
French and Turkish cases can be distinguished as the burqa ban in 
France was worthy of the margin of appreciation due to the fact 
that it was not expressly based on the veil’s religious symbolism 
but on the fact that it conceals the face,55 which implies that the ban 
                                                   
51  See Sahin, supra note 7, para. 115, citing first instance Chamber judgment 
paras. 107-09.  The extremist political movements to which the Court refers are a 
reference to the Court’s case Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) & Others v. Turkey, 
where the Court held that given Turkey’s special history, the dissolution of the 
established Islamic political party is necessary in order to protect pluralism and a 
democratic system, and therefore does not violate the Convention.  See Refah 
Partisi (the Welfare Party) & Others v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-60936”]} 
[https://perma.cc/FQ3F-CPXL].  Carving out a special treatment and granting a 
wider margin of appreciation for restrictive state practices on account of the indi-
vidual state’s special political and historical situation is frequently done by the 
Court.  See, e.g., Rekvenyi v. Hungary, App. No. 25390/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58262 [https://perma.cc/FU8E-2H9S]; Re-
publican Party of Russia v. Russia, App. No. 12976/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011)., 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104495 [https://perma.cc/KH5N-DXY7].  
52  See discussion of line of cases emanating from France infra Section 3.4.   
53  Stijn Smet, Freedom of Religion v. Freedom from Religion: Putting Religious 
Dictates of Conscious (Back) on the Map, in THE LAUTSI PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 113, 125 
(Jeroen Temperman ed., 2012).  
54  On the interplay of social and political changes and religion in Turkey 
from 2002 onwards, see WILLIAM HALE & ERGUN OZBUDUN, ISLAMISM, DEMOCRACY 
AND LIBERALISM IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF THE AKP 68–79 (2009).  
55  See SAS, supra note 9, para. 136.  
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in Turkey was unjustified since it was based solely on the religious 
connotations of the prohibited symbols.  However, since the 
French 2011 Law, banning burqas, was supported by the log of the 
French parliament resolutions clearly stressing the need to defend 
Republican values in the face of subversive religious threat,56 these 
two cases cannot be substantively distinguished solely on these 
grounds, and the primary difference seems to be the respondent 
state. 
Overall, despite the otherwise low status of Turkey in the eyes 
of the Court, the Court might have previously treated Turkish sec-
ularism as worthy of the margin of appreciation due to its defer-
ence to high-status states in order to improve its own status of an 
instrument of democratization.57  Yet recent and ongoing changes 
in socio-political reality and social norms have likely pushed the 
Court in a different direction.  Superficially, this redirection might 
appear as good news for those seeking an increased acceptance of 
religious symbols in the public space and a signal of the Court’s in-
creased permissiveness and understanding of the context and dif-
ferences.  However, there are more likely signals that nowadays, in 
the area of religious symbols (as already the case in other areas), 
the Court considers Turkey to be a low-status state whose legal 
system and underlying social norms are both prone to violation of 
the Convention and generally substantively differing from the 
Court’s view of human rights and secularism.58 
 
                                                   
56  Id., paras. 15-17, 24-26 (detailing the background behind the French report 
proposing a resolution to reassert Republican values and “condemn as contrary to 
those values the wearing of a full-face veil”). 
57  Madsen, supra note 19, at 163–64 (contrasting the Court’s approach to situ-
ations in Italy and Turkey to establish that its purpose varies significantly depend-
ing on the sociopolitical realities present in the specific country; the Court’s func-
tion in relation to Turkey, for example, is to propel its democratization). 
58  See, i.e., Izzettin Dogan and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 62649/10, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-162697 
[https://perma.cc/JTK6-AEE4] (finding that the Turkish state’s treatment of the 
Alevi Islamic community and its places of worship is incompatible with the state 
duty of neutrality and impartiality, irrespective of the fact that the unfavorable 
treatment of the Alevi community was based on the requirements of secularism 
which the Court upheld in cases involving headscarves) and infra Section 4.1. (ar-
guing that the Court will be more permissive toward religious symbols and reli-
gion in general in cases when the status of the state coincides with the cultural or 
social status of the symbol or religious group). 
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3.  MOBILIZATIONS 
 
The Court’s application of the doctrine of the margin of appre-
ciation by definition supports the status quo and social conformism, 
since the doctrine defers to national rules created with an eye on 
state preferences and/or prevalent social norms and expectations.  
The margin of appreciation, therefore, raises no issue of state com-
pliance, largely because there is essentially nothing to comply with.  
While this might be a straightforward impact of the margin of ap-
preciation, the negative, positive, or neutral effects of international 
tribunals depend not only on state (non)compliance but also on ac-
tions and interactions of states and domestic groups.59   
In this part, it is suggested that due to the informational func-
tion of law and status concerns, the Court’s decisions have an addi-
tional mobilizing impact that explains the increase in litigation re-
lated to religious symbols and the mobilization of states and 
various international and domestic constituencies during the 
course of litigation and in the wake of the Court’s decisions.60  Four 
types of mobilizations  are discussed—mobilization of third-party 
interveners, state mobilization, group mobilization, and the mobi-
lization of loyalists—in order to show that each has, at times, ad-
verse effects.  These four types of mobilization overlap to a large 
extent, but in order to clearly isolate the different effects and as-





                                                   
59  Cf. Shrima Baradaran et al., Does International Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 743, 747 (2013) (“Whether international law is ultimately effective in accom-
plishing its goals may depend less on whether a state complies and more on 
whether sub-state entities act consistently with the goals of international law.”).  
60  See SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 8–14 and 136–38. The author argues that in-
ternational human rights treaties have mobilizing effects.  Overall, however, the 
author focuses on mobilization for compliance with human rights treaties, where-
as the argument here is that the Convention is used as a tool for destructive mobi-
lizations that do not aid the individual applicants and whose ultimate outcome 
might even be antithetical to human rights.  See generally Eric Posner, Some Skepti-
cal Comments on Beth Simmons’s Mobilizing for Human Rights, N. Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & 
POL. 819 (2012) (criticizing Simmons argument).  
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3.1.  Mobilization of Third-Party Interveners 
 
Litigation involving controversial religious groups and socially 
divisive religious symbols attracts third-party interveners.  Such 
third-party interveners are motivated by special stakes they have 
in religious groups succeeding or failing in their legal claims, and 
their interest increases proportionally to the public saliency of the 
case.61  The hallmark of third party intervention in the Court is that 
both the CoE states and non-state actors, that are not the direct par-
ties to the case, can act as third-party interveners in the course of 
litigation.62  Theoretically, third party interveners can improve the 
quality of litigation in terms of supplying quality evidence and, in 
the case of non-state interveners, improve, through legal aid, the 
equality of arms between the (usually) underfunded applicants 
and the resourceful CoE states.63  However, in the case of litigation 
in the Court pertaining to religious symbols, effects of third-party 
interventions are likely negative.  The width and breadth of third-
party interventions skews the process, and produces wasteful at-
tempts at excess litigation, for the reasons elaborated below. 
The CoE states are “repeat players” in front of the Court.  
Helfer and Slaughter argue that states have interest in the Court’s 
decisions as they use these to gradually align their national regula-
tions with the Court’s interpretation of the Convention.64  Yet, in 
cases involving contentious social issues and controversial reli-
gious symbols, a state might also have an interest in intervening in 
                                                   
61  Richardson, supra note 14, at 286–87 (showing the ways in which third par-
ty partisans can play a key role in defending religious freedom, or alternatively, 
attacking it). 
62  See European Convention on Human Rights art. 36(2), Nov. 4, 1950; see also 
Rule 44(3)(a), Rules of Court at Rules of Court - European Court of Human Rights, 
(2016), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/TPV9-7KB4].  For a more detailed description of the process of 
the third-party intervention in the Court, see Edita Gruodytė & Stefan Kirchner, 
Legal Aid for Intervenors in Proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, 2 
INT’L. COMP. JURIS. 36, 40–41 (2016) (parsing the language of the Article 36(2) of the 
Convention and discussing who can intervene and under what conditions).  
63  See generally Gruodytė and Kirchner, supra note 62 at 40 (noting that the 
legal aid is indispensable for ensuring access to justice and that “this is particular-
ly true in instances in which the person who is in need of financial support find 
him– or herself already in a structurally weaker position than the other party, for 
example in cases in which a citizen faces the government.”). 
64  Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Su-
pranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 317 (1997).  
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the dispute in order to sustain the status quo and prevent or 
preempt a situation in which the litigation and the Court’s decision 
become a focal point for a positive or negative social mobilization 
of religious groups and their supporters with an interest in the 
faith of a religious symbol.65  The Court can (mis)use state interven-
tion as a signal (of dubious veracity) that indeed there exists (or 
does not exist) a consensus of the states in favor of or against the 
applicant’s claims, which serves as cornerstone of the Court’s mar-
gin of appreciation analysis.66   
Ultimately, through the generation of sheer noise, the states 
acting as third party interveners can inflate the extent of the social 
controversy related to a particular religious symbol.  This creates a 
structural procedural imbalance for the applicant, who finds them-
selves outweighed by de facto multiple influential opponents, since 
the Court, given its status concerns, is more cognizant of state 
pressure than an individual applicant’s arguments.67 
                                                   
65   See Richard McAdams, Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1649, 1651 (2000) (explaining how law, through its expressive function, can pro-
vide a focal point around which individuals can coordinate their behavior).  States 
acting as third-party interveners in previous cases become beneficiaries of Courts’ 
judgment favorable to state interveners’ views in later decisions.  The Belgian 
government, which itself had enacted a general ban on face veils, intervened on 
the side of France in support of the burqa ban; see SAS, supra note 9, paras. 86-88 
(discussing the procedural history and explaining the reasoning behind the Bel-
gian ban on face veils).  Later on, relying on the theory of “living together” devel-
oped in SAS and the margin of appreciation, the Court approved the general ban 
on face veils in Belgium.  See Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, App. No. 
37798/13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-
5788361-7361157, [https://perma.cc/UUR3-62K5]; and Dakir v. Belgium, App. 
No. 4619/12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-
5788319-7361101, [https://perma.cc/W7ZD-NH5G]. 
66  See Helfer and Slaughter, supra note 64, at 316–17 (delineating how the 
Court uses national consensus on an issue to strike a balance between deference 
and independent judicial review in its margin of appreciation analysis). 
67  The same conclusion, more directly based on a need to protect the right to 
fair trial, is reached by Gruodytė and Kirchner, supra note 62 at 41 (arguing that it 
is a government’s obligation to protect third party interests, even without their 
inclusion in a trial, so their explicit participation requires an acute awareness and 
addressing of the structural imbalance created for the applicant).  An implication 
that immediately suggests itself is that the possibility of states intervening as third 
parties opens the Court to pressure and decreases its independence.  For opinions 
to the contrary cf. Guzman, Rational Choice Analysis, supra note 15 at 227 footnote 
145 (“Other features supporting independence (of international tribunals) include 
the ability of third parties to participate in the process. . .”), and Eric A. Posner & 
John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 51 
(2005) (suggesting that the right of third parties to intervene in a dispute can serve 
as a measure of judicial independence in international tribunals).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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The Lautsi litigation is a case at point.  In Lautsi I the Court, 
prompted by an atheist parent complaint, held that a state-installed 
cross in a public school in Italy is a “powerful external symbol” 
that has no place in public schools as it undermines the confession-
al neutrality and pluralism with adverse effects on the rights of 
children and their parents.68  After the Court’s decision provoked 
widespread public resentment, in the interim period before the 
Lautsi Grand Chamber decision, a consortium of governments 
(Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, Greece, Lith-
uania, Malta and San Marino) intervened in the Court as third par-
ty interveners.  The consortium argued that half of the European 
population lives in non-secular states with various church-state ar-
rangements, and the Court should be alerted to a possible flood of 
litigation seeking prohibition of religious symbols in schools if 
Lautsi I is upheld.  Most of the intervening states were previously 
found to be frequent violators of Article 9 of the Convention by the 
Court, and some of them (i.e. Russia) had little to worry about in 
relation to future litigation against them, as they habitually fail to 
comply with the Court’s decisions.69   
Despite their mostly weak human rights and compliance rec-
ord, responding to the concentrated opposition, the Court allowed 
only the intervening states to take part in oral proceedings during 
the Lautsi Grand Chamber deliberations, but not the NGOs on the 
side of the applicant.70  In the final Lautsi Grand Chamber judg-
                                                   
68  Lautsi I, supra note 8, paras. 54-56 (describing how hanging a crucifix in a 
school may be harmful to children).  Although the Italian government argued that 
for historical reasons and due to a lack of the European consensus on the issue of 
state-promoted religious symbols in educational setting the margin of apprecia-
tion applies, the Court avoided addressing the argument, see id. para. 41.  See also 
Zoe Luca, Case of Lautsi v Italy: Religious symbols in public schools and the (lack of) 
margin of appreciation, 17 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. COMP. L. 98, 102-04 (2010) (discussing 
the implications of the Court’s lack of response to the Government’s argument 
that, when interpreting the principle of secularism, states enjoy a margin of ap-
preciation).  
69  See Teresa Sanader, Religious Symbols and Garments in Public Places – a Theo-
ry for the Understanding of S.A.S. v. France, 9 VIENNA J. INT’L. CONST. L. 186, 203 note 
116 (2015) (noting that “interveners are mostly the states against which a violation 
of Article 9 ECHR was found in the past” and providing a list of Article 9 viola-
tors). 
70  See Lautsi Grand Chamber, supra note 8, para. 8 (list of parties who were 
given leave to intervene as a third party); see also Laura Van den Eynde, An Empir-
ical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human Rights NGOs Before the European 
Court of Human Rights, 31/3 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271, 273 n. 7 (2013) (“only states 
were allowed to take part in the public hearings.”). 
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ment, the Court ultimately corrected itself and re-described the 
same state-installed cross as a passive historical symbol beyond its 
reach, tacitly conceding that, when it comes to the regulation of re-
ligious symbols, states can largely expect to enjoy a margin of ap-
preciation.71  This was an implicit recognition that, as the Italian 
foreign minister succinctly put it, “the popular sentiment in Europe 
had won.”72 
In other words, the notice to the Court to consider background 
state-backed social norms and future litigation was hardly a result 
of states’ willingness to reconsider their regulation in light of the 
Court’s decision.  Rather, it was a warning signal to the Court. The 
states and their supporters signaled that the Lautsi Grand Chamber 
decision and future similar decisions, if unfavorable to the states, 
would not only remain collectively unenforced by the traditional 
low-status non-enforcers, and potentially by a larger group of 
states, but likely provoke social mobilization in opposition to the 
Court’s judgment, which would further undermine the Court’s sta-
tus, since concerted collective non-compliance makes the Court 
                                                   
71  See Lautsi Grand Chamber, supra note 8, para. 70-72 (holding that the lack 
of European consensus on the question of the presence of religious symbols and 
paraphernalia in state schools calls for the margin of appreciation, and stressing 
that “a crucifix on a wall is an essentially passive symbol and this point is of im-
portance in the Court’s view,”).  For a general critique of the argumentation used 
in the Lautsi Grand Chamber decision, see Stanley Fish, Crucifixes and Diversity: The 
Odd Couple, OPINIONATOR, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/crucifixes-and-diversity-the-
odd-couple/ [https://perma.cc/UY4N-B3QB] (“It may be the case that over the 
centuries the crucifix has become allied with secular values in the sense that the 
religion it represents no longer sets itself against them; but that doesn’t mean that 
the crucifix, especially when installed by law in state-administered classrooms, is 
no longer a Christian symbol and the bearer of a distinctly Christian message (sal-
vation is by Christ and through the Church) non-believers might find uncomfort-
able and pressuring.”).  For a critique of the application of the margin of apprecia-
tion in Lautsi Grand Chamber decision, see Kristin Henrard, Shifting Visions about 
Indoctrination and the Margin of Appreciation Left to States, 6 RELIG. HUM. R. 245, 249–
251 (2011) (“it chooses to argue that the greater visibility of Christianity through 
the crucifixes is balanced out by the fact that the school environment opens the 
door up to other religions as well, once again ignoring crucial differences in terms 
of duration and government imprint.”).  For an opinion to the contrary, see Mon-
ica Lugato, The Margin of Appreciation and Freedom of Religion: Between Treaty Inter-
pretation and Subsidiarity, 52 J. CATHOL. LEG. STUD. 49 (2013) (arguing that the 
Court’s use of the rules on treaty interpretation and the principle of subsidiarity 
provided its decision with a sound legal basis). 
72  Riazat Butt, European Court of Human Rights rules crucifixes are allowed in 
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and the Convention redundant.73  For these reasons, a third-party 
state intervention arguably serves as an early signal of the extent of 
the threat of non-compliance. 
The effects of the non-state third-party intervention on the side 
of the applicant are different to those of when states act as third-
party interveners in favor of other states.  Many cases in the Court 
draw the attention of non-state third-party interveners like NGOs 
to join litigation in front of the Court, mostly on the side of the ap-
plicant, by so increasing the overall drive to litigate.74  If the dis-
pute involves a religious symbol of considerable controversy, as 
was the case with the burqa ban in SAS v. France,  third party inter-
vention by non-state actors can increase the public saliency of the 
case and provide resources and a motivation to litigate.75  Howev-
er, rare empirical studies show that NGOs’ third-party interven-
tions do not seem to significantly increase an applicant’s chances of 
prevailing in the Court.76  At the same time, prolonged litigation of 
socially controversial religious symbols such as the burqa increases 
the social distance and adversarial relations between the individual 
and their environment, without any beneficial effects.77   
                                                   
73  For arguments to the contrary, albeit in a context of final judgments, see 
Dothan, supra note 28 at 134–35 (theorizing that several low-reputation states act-
ing jointly are unlikely to defy the Court due to free-riding concerns and publicity 
required for their actions to be effective); see also Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 852 
(wondering “. . . to what extent it is really possible to envision credible threats by 
member States to challenge the court’s authority in reaction to unpopular judg-
ments.”).  
74  For various reasons, local and international NGOs are among the Court’s 
key constituencies.  See Alter et. al.., supra note 13, at 24–25 (explaining that civil 
society is an important contributor to the enlargement of the Court’s authority be-
cause NGOs often file test cases, monitor suits filed by private litigants, and coor-
dinate medium and long–term litigation strategies among litigants, attorneys, and 
government officials).  Third party intervention by NGOs (and other bodies) in 
front of the Court is continuously increasing, particularly in recent years; see 
Eynde, supra note 70, at 280 Figure 1.  
75  A number of NGOs intervened on the side of the applicant seeking to 
overturn the burqa ban in France; see SAS, supra note 9, paras. 89-98 (listing the 
third-party interveners, including Amnesty International, ARTICLE 19, and the 
Human Rights Centre of Ghent University). 
76  See Eynde, supra note 70, at 292–93 (doubting the existence of a positive 
correlation between NGO third–party intervention and applicant success).  
77  The experience of women wearing burqas in Europe suggests that their 
social position in the course of – and in the aftermath of – the litigation became 
worse, not better. For example, the applicant in the SAS case experienced threats 
and requested anonymity during the Court proceedings for fear of further har-
assment; see Eva Brems, Face Veil Bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The 
Importance of Empirical Findings, 22 J. L. POL’Y 517, 524–25 (2014) (recounting true 
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Overall, since the Court’s status concerns motivate it toward 
valuing high-status state interests over those of an applicant with 
socially distant religious practices, chances are the applicants will 
end on the losing side and will eventually have to seek ways to 
consensually negotiate symbolic practices with their immediate 
environment.  The non-state actors’ intervention on the side of ap-
plicants with socially distant religious practices likely only pro-
longs this process, to the detriment of the applicant. 
 
3.2.  State Mobilizations 
 
The Court’s status concerns and the discrepancy between high 
and low status of states endows the decisions of the Court with a 
different informational value for high- and low-status states.  Low-
status states with weaker human rights records and a resolution to 
oppose the Court have little to fear and much to gain from the 
Court’s decisions.  If the Court approves their rules and practices 
or defers to those under the doctrine of the margin of apprecia-
tion—the effect is the same—the rules gain additional credibility as 
being “in accordance with human rights standards.”  In opposite 
cases, costs are negligible.  States’ reputations for adherence to 
human rights standards will not suffer immensely since they were 
weak in the first place,78 and the worst they can expect is minor 
material costs.79  A good illustration is Russia’s stance toward the 
decisions finding that it violated Article 9 of the Convention.  Ex-
cept for the payment of minuscule litigation costs and damages, 
                                                   
stories of how women were negatively affected in the aftermath of the litigation).  
See also Alter et.al. supra note 13, at 25 (noting that NGO advocacy can be a dou-
ble-edged sword).  
78  The same logic holds for (non-)compliance with human rights treaties in 
general.  See Hathaway, supra note 16, at 2011 (“If countries may obtain reputa-
tional benefits from ratifying some treaties while suffering little reputational cost 
from failing to observe the obligations assumed, countries may be substantially 
more likely to fail to comply with their treaty obligations. . .it is possible that the 
expressive benefit of a treaty is at its greatest for precisely those countries not al-
ready in compliance with the treaty - those countries may have more to gain, and 
perhaps less to lose, than those with good practices and hence good reputation.”). 
79  See ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014) at 49 and 
note 7 (discussing studies showing relatively weak state compliance with the 
Court’s decisions and very low litigation costs and damages awarded by the 
Court).  For a review of literature that claims that the Court’s decisions enjoy a 
relatively high level of compliance, see Dothan, supra note 28, at 119 n. 13. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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Russia mostly refused to implement the Court’s decisions, with lit-
tle or no damage to its reputation, and without leaving the CoE.80 
The situation is more promising for high-status states consid-
ered staunch supporters of the Court.  On average, these states 
seem to eventually comply with Court’s decisions,81 however their 
statuses make them less likely to suffer losses in the Court and 
more likely to enjoy deference, with the effect being that the status 
quo is confirmed as in line with human rights.  The same status af-
fords opportunities to continuously experiment with laws and 
practices that might appear to be a performance contrary to human 
rights standards before their inspection by the Court. Since low 
performance has no effect on high-status states, they are in a better 
position to push down the bar of human rights standards and in-
vite others to do so.82  If the Court finds that the new practice of a 
high-status state is in line with human rights standards, other 
states can “jump the wagon” and, on aggregate, the result is a 
spread of conformity.   
An example of this process is readily available: prior to the SAS 
decision, as the Court itself noted, the French position on the total 
                                                   
80  See Richardson and Lee, supra note 45, at 298 (“Enforcing [. . .] decisions 
has been problematic [. . .] since Russia’s usual response is eventually to pay the 
limited financial awards but not to change its policies and practices.”).  To illus-
trate how the Court’s miniscule damages have no effect on the behavior of states, 
consider that in response to one of the Court’s judgments awarding the sum of 
3,000 EUR as a just satisfaction to the organizers of the banned gay pride parade, 
one Member of the Russian Parliament proclaimed that Russia was ready to pay 
3,000 Euros every year, but there would be no such parades in Moscow; see Kan-
stantsin Dzehtsiarou & Alan Greene, Legitimacy and the Future of the European Court 
of Human Rights: Critical Perspectives from Academia and Practitioners, 12 GER. L. J. 
1707, 1709 (2011) (“Perceptions of ECtHR judgments as merely awarding just sat-
isfaction are damaging to its effectiveness as a whole. Therefore, the importance of 
general measures should be emphasized by the ECtHR, and their meaning should 
be clear.”). 
81  Madsen, supra note 19, at 164 et seq. 
82  Cf. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, supra note 16, at 1378 (arguing that interna-
tional human rights treaties “. . . may at times provide governments with a shield 
for increasingly repressive behaviors after ratification, as treaty ratification confers 
on them human rights legitimacy and makes it difficult for others to pressure 
them for further action.”); see also Fionnuala Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: 
Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 101, 114 (1995) 
(“Where ostensibly democratic states have engaged in the suspension of certain 
rights guaranteed under the Convention, the Commission and Court are less ex-
acting in their requirements.”). Guzman and Linos labeled this phenomenon 
“human rights backsliding”, a tendency for states otherwise committed to the pro-
tection of human rights to weaken their domestic human rights regimes after join-
ing human rights treaties, see Guzman and Linos, supra note 16 at 605. 
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burqa ban in public spaces was a minority position in Europe.83  
Once the Court affirmed that French burqa ban lay within the wide 
margin of appreciation afforded to states, other countries mobi-
lized to enact their own bans, explicitly or implicitly relying on the 
Court’s decision as justification.84 
What emerges from this explanation is that usual rationale be-
hind application of margin of appreciation—the imperfect consen-
sus among states—is misleading.  The absence of state consensus is 
considered to be inversely related to the margin of appreciation: 
less consensus means the Court will grant larger margins to the 
state-backed national social norms and vice versa.85  Yet, given the 
relative diversity of the state-backed social norms amongst the CoE 
states, there will always be examples available signaling the lack of 
consensus.  The sheer difference in social norms and institutional 
architecture among the CoE states always provides some justifica-
tion for deference via the margin of appreciation.  If reasons of the 
lack of consensus as justification for the Court’s deference would 
be taken to extreme, then the Court would always have to defer to 
the states.86 
The explanation advanced here is that the margin of apprecia-
tion is the Court’s deflection tactic to allow it to wait for a high-
status state to make the first move, thus mobilizing other states on 
the way, and sparking the creation of partial, emerging consensus87 
                                                   
83  See SAS, supra note 9, para. 156 (“[. . .] from a strictly normative stand-
point, France is very much in a minority position in Europe: with the exception of 
Belgium, no other member State of the Council of Europe has, to date, opted for 
such a [ban].”). 
84  See EVA BREMS, SAS V FRANCE: A REALITY CHECK 2 (2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2810221, [https://perma.cc/3SCH-A5QZ] 
(“the Grand Chamber judgment of SAS provides legal and political shelter to all 
existing face covering bans across Europe, as well as to any that might still be in 
the pipeline.”). For a list of legislative proposals to ban burqas in various Europe-
an countries, see id. at 2, note 6. Of course, this is not to say that these countries 
would not have enacted the bans in the absence of a pronouncement from the 
Court.  
85  See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 851 (discussing the relationship between the 
consensus and margin of appreciation doctrine). 
86  The absence of a European consensus is an important–but not the only–
factor the Court takes into account when deciding whether to grant states a wider 
or narrower margin of appreciation. Accordingly, as the Court claims, where “a 
particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the 
margin allowed to the State will normally be restricted.” See S.H. and Others v. 
Austria, App. No. 57813/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. para 94 (2011) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-107325 [https://perma.cc/M73N-LLQP]. 
87  Cf. Dothan, supra note 28, at 135 (suggesting that the ability to influence 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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through the creation of a focal point and ensuing cascades of 
norms through availability.88  In the example of France’s burqa 
ban, the policy of the high-status state and the Court’s confirma-
tion of it creates the focal point by increasing the saliency and epis-
temic availability of the policy in public discourse, leading to a 
chain reaction that later makes the policy acceptable as a result of 
the internal and status-seeking motives of other states and sectors 
of society within and across states.  Over time, a sufficient number 
of states mimicking the first mover can convince the Court that 
there exists an emerging consensus (the doctrinal opposite of the 
margin of appreciation)89 within CoE states’ views on a particular 
policy (i.e. the burqa ban), which the Court must now take into ac-
count in order to adapt the meaning of the Convention to changing 
conditions.90   
                                                   
other states gives influential (high reputation) states additional leverage against 
the Court).  The Court claims that, when identifying the emerging consensus, it 
takes into account developments in many member states; see, e.g., Fabris v. France, 
App. no. 16574/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 56 (2013) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-116716, [https://perma.cc/H6KL-VZDC] 
(“the Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting 
States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to 
be achieved”).  However, at the same time, the Court does not necessarily disap-
prove of legal and social experimentation. Relying on the margin of appreciation, 
the Court can tolerate a single state imposing a new restriction even if no other 
state has done anything similar. In light of the absence of a European consensus, 
the French burqa ban seems to have been one such experimental law approved by 
the Court.  See McGoldrick, supra note 6 at 30 (“It is clear that [The Court] is open 
to States to impose new restrictions on rights and these may fall within the [mar-
gin of appreciation] even if other states have not imposed them.”). 
88  On focal points, see McAdams, Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, supra 
note 65, at 1651 (“[t]he law provides a focal point around which individuals can 
coordinate their behavior[:] when individuals have a common interest in coordi-
nating, [. . .] a legal rule may guide behavior merely by influencing expectations 
about how others will behave.”).  On availability cascades, see Timur Kuran & 
Cass Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 
(1999) (defining availability cascades as a process through which “expressed per-
ceptions trigger chains of [. . .] responses that make these perceptions appear in-
creasingly plausible through their rising availability in public discourse.”).  
89  See Glor v. Switzerland, App. no. 13444/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 75 (2009) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92525 [https://perma.cc/DF6T-53H3] 
(“One of the relevant factors in determining the scope of the margin of apprecia-
tion left to the authorities may be the existence or non-existence of common 
ground between the laws of the Contracting States”).  
90  Cf. Shai Dothan, Judicial Deference Allows European Consensus to Emerge 18 
CHI. J. INT’L. LAW (forthcoming 2018) (discussing the influence of the first mover 
country on policies of other countries, the relationship between the emerging con-
sensus and the margin of appreciation, and the problems of identifying emerging 
consensus in the case of burqa bans.)  
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As the states are heterogeneous, the Court’s confirmation of the 
first mover high-status state policy will not convince all states to 
follow the same path, and those that do will likely do so for inau-
thentic reasons unrelated to those that motivated the first mover.  
Nevertheless, the creation of an emerging consensus by the first-
mover high-status state and through later mimicry by other states 
ultimately increases the Court’s status, since it retroactively justi-
fies its deference while risking one of the damaging consequences 
of availability cascades: populist firestorms and sectarian ten-
sions.91 
 
3.3.  Group Mobilizations 
 
In and of themselves, religious symbols have very different 
meanings in different contexts, and the continuum and variance of 
contexts, speakers, and audiences can change the meaning of the 
same symbol from purely religious to entirely secular or commer-
cial.92  This view of symbols, however, somewhat underestimates 
the social function and effects of religious symbols.  Even if their 
meaning is infinitely variable and ultimately secularized and emp-
tied of their religious and historical baggage, religious symbols can 
serve as credibility-enhancing group coordination signals.93  From 
an external point of view, a religious symbol enhances the credibil-
ity and the visibility of the group to which a symbol belongs in a 
wider social setting—the everyday appearance of a headscarf or 
                                                   
91  Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 736. For Kuran and Sunstein, availabil-
ity cascades can cause populist firestorms and are essentially a problem of democ-
racy, as they distort and misrepresent citizens’ actual beliefs, desires, and judg-
ments. From their point of view, courts have a role to play in preventing reactions 
to availability cascades and regulating risks they create.  See id.at 758–759. But 
there is no reason to think that the Court and states strategically interacting and 
mimicking each other’s behavior cannot have a role in perpetuating availability 
cascades, especially when engaging in legal and social experimentation. As Kuran 
and Sunstein acknowledge, courts are not immune to availability cascades, since 
the outcome of legal cases conveys an institutional message and affects social 
struggles over the meaning of legal cases.  See id. 765-766. 
92  For a brief overview of the possible varieties of meanings of religious 
symbols, see Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale Annicchino, Cross, Crucifix, Cul-
ture: An Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confession Symbols, 13 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 71, 82–87 (2014).  
93  Christian Eilinghoff, Religious Information and Credibility, 1 GER. WORK. PAP. 
LAW ECON, Paper 8 (2003).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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cross or burqa turns it into an acceptable social meme.  From an in-
ternal point of view, religious symbols act as a mechanism for reli-
gious groups to sustain group membership by creating group 
boundaries. As group boundaries are used for intra-group sus-
tainment and intergroup differentiation, symbols are particularly 
contested in times of conflict and used for purposes of group 
mobilization.94  This is the polarizing effect of religious symbols: 
even if those adhering to or opposing particular symbols see noth-
ing particularly “religious” about them, symbols can easily become 
focal points of conflict over social meaning and group loyalties. 
From this perspective, and depending on the circumstances, 
the Court’s decision can be perceived as a violation of social mean-
ing, providing a cause for group mobilization.95 Consider the fol-
lowing two examples: various objections by social and political 
groups that mobilized against the Court’s decisions in Lautsi I boil 
down to this: Social meaning of the cross or its regulation in the 
public space is not a matter for a Court to discuss, but is instead 
best left to society.96  The Court succumbed and eventually con-
firmed this in the Lautsi Grand Chamber judgment, relying on the 
margin of appreciation.  Vice versa, when in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey 
the Court stuck to the margin of appreciation and upheld the ban 
on headscarves in Turkish universities, the decision was a cause for 
group mobilization resulting in the constitutional amendment in 
2008 which effectively allowed headscarves into the public educa-
                                                   
94  See Jeffrey R. Seul, ‘Ours is the Way of God’: Religion, Identity, And Intergroup 
Conflict, 36 J. PEACE RES. 553, 564 (1999) (“[. . .] when conflict involving one or 
more religious groups does occur, the combatants may be emboldened by a sense 
of religiously defined identity and purpose, and their traditions may provide a 
fund of symbolic, moral, institutional, and other resources that can be used to 
mobilize the group and legitimate its cause.”). 
95  The impact of law depends on and affects social meaning, which Lessig 
defined as “the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or sta-
tuses, within a particular context,” see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social 
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995).  
96  For example, among many others, thirty-three members of the European 
Parliament, acting collectively as interveners in Lautsi Grand Chamber case, ar-
gued that “the Court was not a constitutional court and had to respect the princi-
ple of subsidiarity and recognise a particularly broad margin of appreciation in 
favour of Contracting States not only regarding the relationship between the State 
and religion but also where they carried out their functions in the area of educa-
tion and teaching . . . . [T]he display of crucifixes in public buildings did not con-
flict with the Convention, and the presence of religious symbols in the public 
space should not be seen as a form of indoctrination but the expression of a cul-
tural unity and identity.” See Lautsi Grand Chamber, supra note 8, para. 56.  
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tional system.97 The amendment encountered short-lived resistance 
by the Turkish Constitutional Court, to no avail. Prohibitions of 
headscarves in public educational institutions in Turkey were 
eventually dropped.98 
Two negative effects likely occurred in the process of these 
group mobilizations: group polarization and the decrease in in-
group diversity and overall social pluralism.  As the Lautsi I exam-
ple shows, by choosing the more activist posture and striking 
down the state-installed cross in public schools, the Court trans-
formed a symbol that might indeed became, for historical reasons, 
aligned with secular values, into an identity-preserving symbol.  In 
doing so, it has made future voluntary negotiations over the pres-
ence and meaning of the symbol more difficult.  The Court’s deci-
sion attracted the noise of the defenders of the symbol and silenced 
those that might adhere to the cross as a symbol but would, for 
various reasons, prefer to see it removed from public schools.  The 
decision not to defer to the prior state-backed social norm under-
mined possibilities for achieving societal consensus on the mean-
ing of the cross under the circumstances of increased diversity.  
What was previously perhaps an authentic support for the cross as 
a religious symbol in the schools is now likely a merely instrumen-
tal opportunistic or strategic support, justified by reasons unrelat-
ed to the symbol itself.   
Paradoxically, the Court’s decision in Lautsi I, ostensibly seek-
ing to affect social norms and increase inclusion, ended up con-
firming the prior practice and transforming the surrounding social 
meaning of the religious symbol.  This was decried as a defeat of 
inclusion and a decline of religious neutrality,99 although it is high-
                                                   
97  RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 158–59 (2010) (discussing the 
context behind the ratification of the amendment guaranteeing equal access to the 
public education system, effectively lifting the ban on wearing headscarves in 
schools). 
98  On the treatment of the amendments in the Turkish Constitutional Court, 
see generally Yaniv Roznai & Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendment—The Turkish Perspective: A comment on the Turkish Constitutional 
Court’s Headscarf Decision, 10 INT’L. J. CONST. LAW 175 (2012).  On the dismantling 
of the headscarf ban, see Jonathan Head, Quiet End to Turkey’s College Headscarf 
Ban, BBC NEWS, December 31, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
11880622 [https://perma.cc/MNY7-RGE6] (explaining the context behind the 
amendment and noting both positive reactions and negative backlash). 
99  See, e.g., Richard Moon, Christianity, Multiculturalism, and National Identity: 
A Canadian Comment on Lautsi and Others v. Italy, in THE LAUTSI PAPERS: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 
CLASSROOM 241–66, 263 (Jeroen Temperman ed., 2012) (examining the significance 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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ly questionable as to whether either inclusion or neutrality is in-
creased by removal of the cross, since this action unnecessarily al-
ienates those who would like to retain the cross in the schools 
without any real off-setting benefits to anyone else.100 
A similar process, this time owing to the Court’s upholding of 
the margin of appreciation, occurred in the aftermath of the Sahin 
headscarf decision.  It is highly uncertain that prior to the Sahin de-
cision the headscarf had a politicized meaning, as the Turkish gov-
ernment claimed it to, and the Court, relying on the margin of ap-
preciation, affirmed.101  As the dissenting Justice Tulkens 
recognized, on the record of the Sahin decision, there was nothing 
to suggest that the student was intending to use a headscarf to 
pressure others or send a political message.102  After Sahin, howev-
er, headscarf became a mobilizing identitarian symbol whose ex-
tant individual religious meaning appears to have become entirely 
irrelevant.103  This increased the intra-group solidarity and out-of-
group competition among the supporters and opposers of the 
headscarf in an educational context, producing group polariza-
tion.104  After ensuing social and political change in Turkey, this 
polarization now produces adverse effects, as those who oppose 
the headscarf are now exposed to punitive measures.105   
                                                   
of the crucifix in Canadian institutions).  
100  See Joseph Weiler, Editorial: Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux, 21 EUR. 
J. INT’L. L. 1 (2010) (pointing out that simply removing the cross in public schools 
under current conditions hardly improves inclusion).  
101  See Sahin, supra note 7, para. 115 (citing previous Courts decisions that af-
firm significance of the religious symbolism of the headscarf).  
102  Id. para. 7 (Justice Tulkens, dissenting). For a further discussion along the 
same lines, see Smet, supra note 53 at 126 (examining the fallacies in the Court’s 
assumptions, and noting, for example, that the student was not in a position of 
authority or power and that the “victims” of the potential indoctrination were 
adults, not children).  
103  For an overview of literature on identity disputes related to headscarf is-
sues in Turkey, see Roznai and Yolcu, supra note 97, at 176, and note 4. 
104  Similar polarizing effects also occur when a state supports religious sym-
bols; cf. Eric Posner, The Legal Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEG. THEORY 33, 50–
51 (1996). 
105  This much can be concluded from Pekünlü v. Turkey, App. No. 25832/14, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-174537 
[https://perma.cc/U7DZ-M53Q], where the Court held that an application  by a 
university lecturer who contested his criminal conviction for preventing a student 
wearing a headscarf from entering a higher education institution is inadmissible.  
See AFP, Turkey Jails Professor for “Denying Headscarved Student Entry”, Daily MAIL 
ONLINE (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-
2852116/Turkey-jails-professor-denying-headscarved-student-entry.html 
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In retrospect, under conditions of what is best described as an 
increase in publicity and heterogeneity of local norms and a de-
crease of state social control in Turkey, the Court’s decision to de-
fer to the state-backed rule and prohibit a religious symbol likely 
undermined the possibilities for the mediation of a social dispute 
over a symbol whose concrete social relevance was—and is—
grossly exaggerated, but which served as a focal point for strategic 
mobilizations with far-reaching and dramatic consequences.106 
There is another side to this. Viewed from the outside, religious 
symbols enhance the visibility of the group, whereas viewed from 
the inside they act as a mechanism for sustaining group member-
ship and policing boundaries.  The prohibition of a religious sym-
bol likely increases its value and serves to strengthen in-group sol-
idarity by increasing group commitment and decreasing the 
internal group pluralism and even group membership.107  This is 
because prohibitions of symbols might be acceptable to less enthu-
siastic members of religious groups, and unacceptable for the more 
enthusiastic members of religious groups or their strategic sup-
porters.   
The latter group can use the perception of grievance and the 
sense of rights-entitlement for purposes of social and political mo-
bilization in pursuit of group causes through litigation.108  From a 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/8PKB-FCRK]. 
106  Immediately following the Court’s Fourth Section Sahin decision, later 
confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the Court (see Sahin, supra note 7), Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan alluded to the Court’s decision being polit-
ical and based on double standards.  See Zaman, Erdoğan on Sahin Verdict: Double 
Standard, BIANET (Jul. 5, 2004), http://bianet.org/english/print/38297-erdogan-
on-sahin-verdict-double-standard [https://perma.cc/PGH3-BRPM]. Post-2010, 
the headscarf ban was lifted in both educational and state institutions (with the 
exception of judges, prosecutors, police and military personnel), with Prime Min-
ister Erdoğan commenting that “[a] dark time eventually comes to an end . . . . 
Headscarf-wearing women are full members of the republic, as well as those who 
do not wear it”; see Turkey Lifts Decades-Old Ban on Headscarves, AL JAZEERA 
ENGLISH, October 8, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/10/turkey-lifts-decades-old-ban-
headscarves-201310814177943704.html [https://perma.cc/TC3V-BTXK]. 
107  Cf. Michael W. McConnell & Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Is-
sues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L REV. 1, 58 (1989) (suggesting that similar con-
sequences occur when religious groups are generally persecuted, but that the ex-
act effect depends on the strength of group commitment.)  
108  See Effie Fokas, Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in 
the Shadow of European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence, 4 
OXFORD. J. L. & RELIGION 54, 68-69 and accompanying notes (2015) (discussing how 
litigation mobilizes social and political movements well beyond the immediate 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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strategic point of view, the outcome of the litigation at the Court 
may not matter at all.  Any decision of the Court, whether in favor 
of or against the prohibition of the religious symbol, will be benefi-
cial for committed groups and their strategic supporters with a 
vested interest in the Court’s decision.  The positive decision is a 
criticism of the state-backed prohibition that confirms the group’s 
pre-existing beliefs and mobilizes it for future actions, while the 
negative decision can serve as a cause for adversarial mobilization 
and further increase the group commitment across multiple loca-
tions.  In other words, any decision of the Court can be a useful 
tool for group mobilization. If the Sahin and Lautsi I decision are 
analyzed this way, what appears as a loss or a victory for individu-
al applicants, respectively, was a gain for the strategic norm-
entrepreneurs. 
The picture that emerges out of this analysis is paradoxical.  
Given the adverse effects of group mobilizations, the reality creat-
ed in the aftermath of Court’s decisions is the exact opposite of 
what the Court purports its decisions should help create.  At least 
some of the Court’s holdings on religious symbols have polarizing 
effects and, more problematically, result in a decrease in internal 
in-group diversity and overall social pluralism.  It is simply not the 
case that all Muslim women wear or want to wear headscarves, 
pressure others to do so, or feel pressured by others to do so; nor 
do all committed Catholics or the supporters of Christian traditions 
necessarily always prefer to see crosses in public schools.  Yet, in 
the aftermath of decisions like Lautsi Grand Chamber, Sahin, and 
others to follow, and against the background of group polarization 
and the divisive in- and out-of-group competition, these individu-
als and groups will have a harder time communicating their argu-
ments within in-group or out-of-group communication or in a pub-
lic space.  They are more likely to become internal minorities of the 
majority or “minorities among the minorities.”   
If that is indeed so, however, the Court’s statement on the obli-
gation of CoE States in the Sahin decision appears an irony at best, 
and sarcasm at worst: 
[T]he Court has frequently emphasized the State’s role as 
the neutral and impartial organizer of the exercise of vari-
ous religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is 
conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance 
                                                   
effects of legal decision).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
598 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3 
in a democratic society . . .  Accordingly, the role of the authori-
ties in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by 
eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups 
tolerate each other.109 (emphasis added) 
 
3.4.  Mobilization of Loyalists 
 
Religious symbols are often at loggerheads with state laws.  
Under conditions of heterogeneity, regulation of religious symbols 
can have multiple polarizing effects, producing conflicting loyalties 
and functioning as in- and out-of-group “loyalty tests” for two rea-
sons:  On the one hand, for religious groups, symbols act as mech-
anism for indicating group membership , through which individu-
als arguably signal group loyalty.  On the other, laws function as 
categorizing mechanisms that inform a society of the labeling of a 
group or individual as socially (un)acceptable, coordinating and 
legitimizing the positive or negative group attention toward the al-
ready-categorized-as-socially-distant,110 particularly when the law 
prohibits certain religious symbols and, in doing so, influences 
people’s beliefs and behavior towards the person who engages (or 
refrains from engaging) in the now-forbidden symbolic action. 
As an example, consider the 2011 French Law banning bur-
qas.111  On its face, the law targeted veiled women. However, they 
were hardly its only targets, since laws prohibiting symbols of the 
“other group” are not simple rules, but instead pieces of social in-
formation.  They target not only the opposing group (out-of-
group), but also the in-group outliers who might be hesitant to en-
gage in confrontation with the symbols and practices of the other 
group, all in order to strengthen the in-group solidarity.112  This 
                                                   
109  See Sahin, supra note 7, para. 107, internal citations omitted.  
110  MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK, 91–92, 100-02 (1986) (discuss-
ing how institutions affect social categorizations and attach positive and negative 
labels to behavior and persons).  
111  Loi No 2010-1192 du 11 Oct. 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage 
dans lespace public, Journal Officiel (JORF) 12 Oct. 2010, with additional provi-
sions, in force since April 2011, cited in Steinbach, supra note 9 at 31 n. 17.  
112  On the in-group effects of the prohibition of out-of-group symbols, see 
Eric Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEG. 
STUD. 765, 785–89 (1998).  Effects of prohibition on geographically and cognitively 
distant out-of-group members can be even stronger, see Alex Geisinger & Ivan 
Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, 112 PENN ST. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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means the 2011 Law symbolically targeted two groups: the obvious 
suspects, considered disloyal, not “really French” but preferring 
instead their “Muslim” identity over their “French” one,113 and the 
less obvious suspects, the potentially loyal but faint of heart mem-
bers of the mainstream.  The law, in other words, served as a focal 
point for “mobilizing loyalties,” that is, convincing potentially un-
concerned members of the mainstream that loyalism is a prevalent 
social norm and attitude.114 
Evidence of this phenomenon is available in the SAS case.  Pri-
or to the enactment of the French 2011 Law banning burqas, barely 
1900 women wore a burqa in the country.  In the period between 
2011 and 2016, less than 200 citations for violation were issued per 
year.115  The prohibition, in other words, was not intended to be 
fully applied, but had an expressive and symbolic role with never-
theless very real social effects.  After the 2011 Law confirmed and 
legitimized social disapproval of burqas and their bearers, inci-
dences of attacks on women wearing burqas increased.  The at-
tackers cited loyalty to laïcité as a motivation for the attacks and 
sought to self-enforce the law spontaneously by physically and 
verbally harassing the women wearing burqas.116  As was shown 
during the SAS trial, the application of the 2011 Law legitimized 
                                                   
L. REV. 77, 135 (2007).  This suggests that the burqa ban was perhaps a foreign pol-
icy measure, rather than a purely domestic issue.  
113  The incompatibility of the French and Muslim identity, for historical rea-
sons, has been a lingering topic for many years, see T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Free-
dom and Laicite: A Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 
456 (2004).  
114  As Eric Posner argues, when members of the majority discriminate 
against minorities, they do so not necessarily because of their innate animosity 
towards them, but in order to signal loyalty to other members of the majority, 
which is why norms of discrimination tend to spread (and disappear) rapidly, 
mobilizing large groups of people in the process.  See Posner, Symbols, Signals, and 
Social Norms in Politics and the Law, supra note 112, at 786-87.  
115  See Robert Zaretsky, These Hijab-Inspired Clothes Just Reignited a Major Cul-
ture War in France, THE WEEK (Apr. 7, 2016), 
http://theweek.com/articles/616468/hijabinspired-clothes-just-reignited-major-
culture-war-france [https://perma.cc/ZT7Y-PHPS]. 
116  See Open Society Justice Initiative, After the Ban: The Experiences of 35 
Women of the Full-Face Veil in France, 3, (Sep. 2013), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/after-the-ban-
experience-full-face-veil-france-20140210.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBT7-QVV4], 
and Valeria Costa-Kostristky, France and the Veil – the Dark Side of the Law 
OPENDEMOCRACY (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/valeria-
costa-kostritsky/france-and-veil-%E2%80%93-dark-side-of-law 
[https://perma.cc/RM45-RW6W]. 
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violence against women wearing a burqa and increased their over-
all intersectional structural discrimination, likely because the pro-
hibition emboldened the public who felt compelled to question the 
“true Frenchness” of the veiled women.117 
In essence, the informational function of the 2011 Law was 
hardly only about those who—for reasons of their racial, ethnic, 
and religious background—are allegedly resisting the influence of 
laïcité and healthy assimilation, and are potentially disloyal citi-
zens.118  More likely, it was meant as a loyalty mobilizing mecha-
nism for those within the mainstream that are insufficiently op-
posed to the former group.  The suspicion that the different racial, 
ethnic, and religious groups will exist apart from the rest of the so-
ciety, and therefore exhibit a lack of loyalty corrosive to cultural 
unity, is hardly new in France, and was detested from the early 
days of the French Revolution.119  For complex historical reasons, 
the link between loyalty to the unitary Republic and the fidelity to 
laïcité became intertwined both as a matter of the constitutional 
text120 and the public order of the Republican cultural unity.121  The 
link is meant to signal “adhesion to a political project, loyalty towards a 
civilization which is a common good, and the intense feeling of sharing in 
each other’s fate,”122 with the laïcité having a status of “. . .the first re-
                                                   
117  See SAS, supra note 9, at para. 104, citing Open Society Justice Initiative, 
supra note 116.  
118  As empirical studies show, from the 1970s to the late 1980s, most French 
Muslims held laïcité in high regard and considered it to be a guarantee of reli-
gious freedom, becoming “experts” in laïcité, see AMELIE BARRAS, REFASHIONING 
SECULARISMS IN FRANCE AND TURKEY: THE CASE OF THE HEADSCARF BAN 74 (2014). 
119  In the aftermath of the 1789 French Revolution, the French National As-
sembly debated whether the Jews could be “transformed” into loyal citizens of the 
new French Republic, given Judaism’s communitarian leanings. WENDY BROWN, 
REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 51 (2008).  
Identical views persist even today and, for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
France have been subjected to similar doubts.  See SUSAN PALMER, THE NEW 
HERETICS OF FRANCE: MINORITY RELIGIONS, LA REPUBLIQUE, AND THE GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED “WAR ON SECTS” 200 (2011) (“The Jehovah’s Witnesses are perceived as 
undermining loyalty to the Republic, as they set up their own God-centered 
‘kingdoms.’”).  
120  See Const., Art.1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular (laic), demo-
cratic and social Republic.  It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the 
law, without distinction of origin, race or religion.  It shall respect all beliefs”).  
121  See CÉCILE LABORDE, CRITICAL REPUBLICANISM: THE HIJAB CONTROVERSY 
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 173 (2008) (discussing Republican solidarity and its 
relationship to laïcité).  
122  Fred Constant, La citoyenneté (Montchrestien, 1998) 28, cited in Laborde 
supra note 121 at 181 n. 41, internal citations omitted.  
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ligion of the Republic,” one that requires “obedience and belief.”123 
Litigants like the applicant in SAS and those in earlier trials on 
headscarves in French national courts correctly understood the na-
ture of the laws targeting religious symbols, and, likely aware of 
the epistemic strength of laïcité as tool of the struggle against the 
real or alleged communitarianism present among French Mus-
lims,124 have pledged their own allegiance and loyalty to laïcité to 
no avail.125  Since laïcité itself is simultaneously a value-claim and a 
constitutional standard whose exact scope and outer limits are left 
strategically under-defined, no argumentation or evidence suffic-
es.126  French courts have, on multiple occasions, argued that, even 
in the absence of evidence of social harm, headscarves and burqas 
are an objective threat to the laïcité and the equality of sexes, and a 
means of promoting communal loyalties and group thinking 
against which the Republic must stand united.127 
The Court’s decision in SAS falls into the long line of the 
                                                   
123  Dominique Moïsi cited in Steven Erlanger and Tamura De Freytas-
Tamura, Old Tradition of Secularism Clashes with France’s New Reality, CRUX (Feb. 8, 
2015), http://www.cruxnow.com/faith/2015/02/08/old-tradition-of-secularism-
clashes-with-frances-new-reality/ [https://perma.cc/77NL-NECA]; see also 
Raphael Liogier, Laicite on the Edge in France: Between the Theory of Church-State 
Separation and the Praxis of State-Church Confusion, 9 MACQUARIE L. J. 25, 25–26, 43–
44 (2009) (explaining that laïcité “morphed into a socio-cognitive frame of refer-
ence, a sort of screen wallpaper for France’s social panorama, endorsed as such by 
all social groups”). 
124  On transnational religious communitarianism among French Muslims, 
see John R. Bowen, Does French Islam Have Borders?  Dilemmas of Domestication in a 
Global Religious Field, 106 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 43 (2004). 
125  For analysis of the intersection of loyalty and “foreignness” issues and 
French headscarf trials and debates on burqa banning, see, generally, Liogier, supra 
note 123.  
126  On the vagueness and multiple meanings of laïcité, see JOHN R. BOWEN, 
WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE 32 
(2007) (noting that laïcité is “useful for political debates because its use conveys 
the double illusion that everyone knows what laïcité means and that this meaning 
has long been central to French Republicanism.”).  Similarly, see Herman T. Salton, 
France’s Other Enlightenment: Laicite, Politics and the Role of Religion in French Law, 5 
J. POL. L. 30, 30–31 (2012), and Mohammad Idriss, Lai’cite and the banning of the “hi-
jab” in France, 25 LEGAL STUD. 260, 260–65 (2006) (arguing that there is no single 
definition behind the concept of laïcité because its meaning holds various inter-
pretations amongst academic commentators).  
127  Decisions of French courts and arguments used in cases involving prohi-
bitions of headscarves and burqas in the period 2008–11 (including the post-2011 
burqa-banning law period) are discussed in John R. Bowen, How the French State 
Justifies Controlling Muslim Bodies: From Harm-Based to Values-Based Reasoning, 78 
SOC. RES. 325, 326–344 (2011) (detailing the various arguments for banning burqas, 
which the French courts considered over the years from 2003 to 2011).  
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Court’s controversial French cases involving prohibitions of reli-
gious attire in schools.128  It added an additional aura of human 
rights legitimacy to national laws’ prohibitions, since the Court 
echoed various French courts and provided the ammunition for the 
mobilization of loyalists that sought to prevent an apathetic public 
and future governments from failing, willfully or through sheer in-
ertia, to confront political threats to Republican unity and free-
doms.129   
The process is partially reminiscent of Moravscik’s claim that, 
from a republican-liberal perspective, creating a quasi-independent 
judicial body such as the Court is a tactic used by governments to 
bind (“lock in”) future governments and stabilize institutions in 
the face of nondemocratic political threats,130 in this case a religious 
threat.  The “lock-in” argument was originally developed as an ex-
planation of new Eastern European democracies’ haste to join the 
Convention and accept the Court’s jurisdiction. Given that the pri-
or “lock-in” with the Convention did not prevent governments 
such as that of Hungary (and others) taking a turn toward becom-
                                                   
128  The Court considered multiple applications of Sikh and Muslim primary 
and high school pupils prohibited from wearing turbans and headscarves, respec-
tively, to be inadmissible on the grounds of the margin of appreciation, thereby 
deferring to the French March 2004 law banning ostentatious religious symbols in 
schools.  See cases cited in supra note 31.  Similarly, the Court confirmed the ex-
pulsion of secondary school pupils in France for refusing to remove headscarves 
during physical education and sports classes.  Dogru v France , App. no. 
27058/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90039 
[https://perma.cc/Y3Y7-5UCM]; Kervanci v France , App. no. 31645/04, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90047 
[https://perma.cc/M82C-YFBE].  Apart from the disputes involving religious in-
signia in schools in France, in two far less contested cases, the Court also relied on 
the margin of appreciation to uphold limitations on religious manifestations in the 
context of the security checks.  See El Morsli v. France, App. No. 15585/06, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-2109 [https://perma.cc/N76M-
TK62] (holding that the margin of appreciation allows the French authorities to 
deny an entry visa to an applicant who refuses to remove her veil for an identity 
check); and Phull v. France, App. No. 35753/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-77018 [https://perma.cc/SXF8-XLUC] 
(holding that requiring a practicing Sikh to remove their turban during security 
checks at an airport is a measure within the limits of the margin of appreciation).  
129  See SAS, supra note 9, paras. 15–17 (citing the French Parliament resolu-
tion supporting the 2011 French law banning burqas for reasons of the defense of 
Republican values in the face of subversive religious threat).  
130  See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L. ORG. 217, 220 (2000) (“From a ‘republican 
liberal’ perspective . . . creating a quasi-independent judicial  body is a tactic used 
by governments to ‘lock in’ and consolidate democratic institutions, thereby en-
hancing their  credibility and stability vis-a-vis nondemocratic political threats.”). 
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ing illiberal democracies,131 it remains to be seen whether this strat-
egy will work for high-status states that enjoy more deference from 
the Court. 
 
4.  IMPLICATIONS 
 
The varied treatment of different religious symbols in cases in-
volving France, Italy, Switzerland, and Turkey presented above, 
and the changes and (in)consistencies in the Court’s freedom of re-
ligion jurisprudence in cases involving Turkey as opposed to those 
involving France, show that the sovereign consent and a threat of 
non-compliance as a single cause behind the Court’s fallback on 
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation is only a partial explana-
tion.  The margin of appreciation is the Court’s status-seeking 
mechanism, whose application varies vertically (between the high- 
and low-status states), and horizontally, depending on the social 
status and the distance of religious symbols from mainstream so-
cial norms. 
This part discusses further implications of the vertical status of 
states and horizontal status of norms on the Court’s decision-
making process, and argues that, due to an increase in religious di-
versity, negative mobilizations shift the Court behavior further to-
ward status-based views of states and religion. 
 
4.1.  Vertical Status of States and Status-Based Toleration 
 
The implication that can be derived from the considerations 
discussed above is that most of the time the application of the mar-
gin of appreciation seemingly depends on the inverse relationship 
between state status and the status of a symbol:  the higher status 
of the state and the lower and more socially distant status of the 
symbol, the more leniency is given and the margin of appreciation 
is relied upon.  This increases the Court’s status vis-à-vis high-
status states, for two primary reasons.  Firstly, the Court, with little 
                                                   
131  Id. at 220.  On the turn towards the illiberal democracy in Hungary after 
enactment of the 2012 Hungarian Constitution (Fundamental Law), and the nega-
tive reactions of multiple Europe-wide institutions, including the Court, see Jusic, 
supra note 2, at 209, n.63.  
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risk to itself given the low social status of the disputed symbols, 
enlarges the freedom of action of high status states prospectively, 
or, in other words, the Court second-guesses state future orienta-
tion and aligns itself with it.  Secondly, the Court positions itself as 
a de facto agent of high-status CoE states’ seeking to produce norms 
around which the emerging consensus of both high- and low-
status states can be manufactured.  In short, in dealing with the 
high-status states, the Court, using the margin of appreciation, de-
creases its production of law due to the status of states,132 and it al-
lows high status states to increase the quantity of law and create 
(or give an impetus for the creation of) a consensus through norm 
diffusion that increases social distance internally within states, and 
aims at decreasing the distance across states through the adoption 
of formally similar regulations.133 
This further implies that the Court will be more permissive to-
ward religious symbols and religion in general in cases when the 
status of the state coincides with the cultural or social status of the 
symbol or religious group.  In such cases, Court’s actions are based 
on pragmatic considerations or status-based toleration rather than 
considerations of liberal, inclusive pluralism.  In Eweida and Others 
v United Kingdom, for example, the Court considered the prohibi-
tion of wearing a discreet cross by the private employer an unjusti-
fied interference and found no interference when the public em-
ployer requested virtually the same of the second applicant.134  As 
the case emerged from a high-status state, the UK, and involved a 
symbol that does not suffer from being distanced from mainstream 
norms, it is obvious that Court took no risks.  It did not grant a 
margin of appreciation to a high-status state, but since the nature 
of symbol was within the mainstream, the high status of the state 
was hardly jeopardized. 
Additional evidence that the Court essentially practices status-
based toleration based on convergence of the status of the state and 
religious groups can be found in its other Article 9 cases.  These 
cases involve the treatment of marginal (“low-status”) religious 
                                                   
132  Law varies directly with social status and with higher status, law is more 
lenient and forgiving. DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE 10 (1989). 
133  Cf. MOSHE HIRSCH, INVITATION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
129–56 (2015) (discussing, on the example of interaction between international in-
vestment tribunals and human rights, how cultural distance negatively affects 
norm diffusion among social groups.  Adoption of the similar regulations and 
norms is supposed to decrease the cultural distance between states.).  
134  See Eweida, supra note 3.  
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groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, by the low-status states.135  It 
was not by chance that one of the Court’s first important decision 
finding a violation of Article 9 was the 1993 judgment in Kokkinakis 
v. Greece,136 a case involving Greece’s prohibition of proselytizing 
by Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Prior to this case, nearly all applications 
invoking violations of Article 9 were found to be inadmissible as 
“manifestly ill-founded” by the Court and by the European Com-
mission on Human Rights.  The trend continued and throughout 
the final decade of the 20th and first decade of the 21st century, the 
Court frequently decided in favor of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a reli-
gious group considered to be socially distant and, for that reason, 
persecuted in many countries, finding the low-status states of the 
former Soviet Union and Southeastern Europe, such as Russia and 
Greece, breached their obligation to respect the Convention.137  
Simultaneously, however, the Court was more than lenient to-
wards the punitive treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses and new reli-
gious movements in France, although France’s attitude towards 
non-mainstream religions (“sects”) was arguably more punitive 
than the one found in the countries of the former Soviet Union.138 
 
                                                   
135  See GLEN NEWEY, TOLERATION IN POLITICAL CONFLICT 13 (2013) (referring 
to this type of tolerance of marginal religious groups as status-based tolerance be-
cause it relegates the tolerated to a second-class civic status).  
136  Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57827 [https://perma.cc/F2X6-XQNZ].  
137  See Richardson & Shoemaker, supra note 18, at 106–11 (discussing the dif-
ference in the Court’s decisions on religious freedom in cases involving Greece, 
Russia and France).   
138  Id. at 114.  On the harsh legal and social treatment of “new” religious 
movements such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Soka Gakkai, and Scientology, and mi-
nority religious groups like French Muslims and Sikhs in France, see Palmer, supra 
note 119, at 178 (concluding that “France stands out as a unique example of intol-
erance toward religious minorities among the countries of Western Europe.”).  
Only in 2011 did the Court start signaling a minimal change of attitude toward the 
treatment of minority religions in France.  See Association Les Témoins de 
Jéhovah v. France, App. No. 8916/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105386 [https://perma.cc/A7R6-KJ9S] 
(holding that a supplementary tax assessment of €45 million applied to donations 
marked for Jehovah’s Witnesses violated Art. 9, as it was not a foreseeable regula-
tion in accordance with the law).  Moreover, the case Izzettin Dogan & Others v. 
Turkey arguably falls into this group of cases.  The Alevi community in Turkey 
was perceived and treated as Islamic, but was nevertheless a non-mainstream 
group of a lower status relative to the mainstream Sunni Islam.  See Izzettin 
Dogan & Others v. Turkey, supra note 58, paras. 35–45, para. 133.  In other words, 
the low status of a religious group and the low status of the state have coincided.   
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4.2.  Horizontal Mobilizations and Status 
 
Due to a possibility of non-compliance with the Court’s deci-
sions with little immediate costs, the CoE states ultimately retain 
the upper hand against both the Court and the individuals seeking 
redress in the Court.  This creates a paradox:  given the Court’s 
deference toward the states and the mainstream symbols, such as 
the crucifix, and the Courts rhetoric in cases involving socially con-
troversial religious symbols (the headscarf or burqa), it might seem 
that applicants with socially distant religious practices looking for 
the Court’s support would have little or no incentive to litigate 
claims involving religious symbols.  Similarly, the states would 
have little incentive to put up a strong defense against those 
claims—it would be enough to ignore them.  The cases discussed 
above, however, suggest that for various groups, litigation in the 
Court is a strategy used for various types of mobilizations aimed at 
increasing or protecting their own status.  Such mobilizations occur 
in two somewhat extreme situations both arising when the hori-
zontal status of mainstream and non-mainstream social norms and 
symbols as their expressions are contested. 
At one extreme, mobilization occurs once a disputed religious 
symbol has a strong horizontal social status firmly embedded with-
in mainstream social norms across states (as in, e.g., the Lautsi cas-
es).  The strength of the horizontal embeddedness of the norm 
abolishes the vertical difference between the high and low status 
states and provides a cause for both state and social mobilization 
that can endanger the Court’s status and authority.  In such cases, 
the margin of appreciation is based on a threat of social (not only 
state) non-compliance, and the danger to the Court’s status is ex-
treme due to a possibility of the systemic friction of the institution-
al framework built around the Convention.  Hence, as the Court 
itself is aware, at least in the area of religious symbols, the Court is 
subservient to social norms and its decisions cannot vary widely 
from what the Court perceives as the preexisting social structure in 
which the norms of its audience(s) are created.139  However, this 
sheds doubt on the Court’s oft-repeated statement that the margin 
of appreciation is inversely related to a lack of consensus across 
                                                   
139  On this point, see Mancini, supra note 21, at 26–27 (“The collective reputa-
tion of a court depends, to a large extent, on the audience at which its opinions are 
aimed . . . .  [I]f a court’s interpretations deeply differ from the convictions of the 
people, the people will start resisting judicial decisions.”).   
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states.  In the Lautsi Grand Chamber case, it was the existence of a 
widespread social consensus, around which marginally different 
state systems of expressing the social consensus have been erected, 
that prompted the Court to resort to the margin of appreciation. 
At the other extreme, mobilizations occur at the point when a 
symbol is deemed to be extremely distant from the state-backed 
mainstream norms, as in, e.g., the SAS case, where the state collid-
ed with the socially controversial nature of the burqa; or in Sahin 
case, where, due to the Court’s perception of the oppositional na-
ture of headscarf relative to state-backed mainstream norms, the 
state further collided with an allegedly controversial and socially 
distant symbol.  In such cases, the direction of mobilizations is con-
tingent on the domestic constituencies.  It can move in the direction 
of confirming the embedded mainstream norms like loyalism, as in 
the wake of the SAS case, to which the Court’s decisions more or 
less accede.  Alternatively, as the aftermath of the Sahin case 
shows, in the short- and long-term, mobilization served as a correc-
tive of the Court’s perception, coercing it to adjust its views of the 
distribution of horizontal social norms, for which religious symbols 
are but a proxy.  In the latter case, what was considered a non-
mainstream symbol crossed over to the mainstream. 
The main conclusion is that the Court is captive to social mobi-
lizations and is itself an institution whose status is dependent on—
and even subservient to—wider social approval (or at least the ab-
sence of an active social disapproval), meaning that the Court is 
relevant not only when cooperating with states, but also when co-
operating with social forces.140  Under conditions of contestations 
over social status caused by increased religious diversity, even the 
Court’s resorting to the margin of appreciation, which is basically a 
form of judicial escape, is more likely to exacerbate than to resolve 
tensions, further reducing the function of law as a conflict-
resolving and rights-protecting mechanism.141  Therefore, any at-
                                                   
140  Cf. Malcolm Feeley, Hollow Hopes, Flypaper, and Metaphors, 17 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 745, 751 (1992) (“[T]he conventional wisdom among political scientists 
and sociologists who have studied these matters is that the courts by themselves 
are not very powerful and, at best, are important at the margins or in conjunction 
with other governmental bodies.”).  
141  See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Myth of the Neutral State and the Individualiza-
tion of Religion: The Relationship between State and Religion in the Face of Fundamental-
ism, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2445, 2446 (2009) (discussing judicial escape options in 
cases involving religion and social conflicts); see generally Aileen Kavanagh, Judi-
cial Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 23 (2010) (discussing how 
judicial concerns over social perceptions (“reputation”) result in self-restraint and 
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tempt to venerate the Court as the counter-majoritarian protector 
of the human rights of minorities against the oppressive majori-
ties—an image based on the problematic and somewhat conde-
scending view of oppressed minorities in need of protection—
appears  largely unfounded, and should be viewed with skepti-
cism.142  The Court is only capable of following social changes or 
keeping its finger on the pulse of temporary majorities, but not of 
leading.143 
While the Court itself has, on multiple occasions, stated that it 
will use social change as an indication of the new patterns of social 
behavior and consensus across European societies,144 following the 
temporary majorities is problematic for two reasons.  First, the 
Court may become a victim of the common wisdom fallacy since 
judicial evaluations of social facts or deferral to legislative bodies 
often strengthen conflation of normative assessments and un-
founded empirical observations that do not guarantee normatively 
or empirically appealing results.145   
Second, consensus is prone to biases and various types of social 
falsifications and manipulations.146  For that reason, social consen-
sus is often thin and inauthentic and based on mimicry, as with the 
process of the democratization of Eastern European societies post-
1990 when these countries, partially supported by the Court, were 
                                                   
the sub-optimal protection of human rights). 
142   See Hillel Y. Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L.  REV. 1617, 1624–25 (2015) (discussing how the relative social position of 
religious minorities is often underappreciated, just as the majoritarian oppression 
of minority religions is overappreciated).  The premise that courts, at least those in 
the U.S., are counter-majoritarian institutions has been thoroughly debunked by a 
number of empirical studies, and, for an overview of the relevant literature, see 
Law, supra note 22, at 728–30 and accompanying footnotes.  
143  Similarly, see Helfer and Voeten, supra note 25, at 106 (“[T]he Strasbourg 
Court engages in a kind of majoritarian activism.”).  
144  Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 141 (1993). 
145  On the complicated impact of social and legislative choices on the practice 
of various higher courts, and the need to avoid these, see Niels Petersen, Avoiding 
the Common-Wisdom Fallacy: The Role of Social Sciences in Constitutional Adjudication, 
11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 294, 297 (2013) (arguing that, in the context of judicial deci-
sion-making, “the practical conclusions of a normative argument may be mislead-
ing if the normative argument is based on unrealistic empirical assumptions.”).   
146  See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1997) (claiming that the tendency to 
falsify public preferences to conform to social expectations creates a false sense of 
social consensus).  
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expected to emulate the established democracies.  Unforeseen 
events can turn social change and alleged consensus upside down 
with potentially tragic consequences, as the religious and ethnic 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia and rapid changes in places like 
Turkey amply show.147 
 
4.3.  The Court’s Status Concerns and Status Relativism 
 
With exceptions for discreet symbols worn by employees of 
private entities established by Eweida and symbols in public space 
established by Ahmet Arslan (later contradicted by SAS), the 
Court’s jurisprudence on religious symbols so far exhibits two 
trends.  First, the Court embraces the progressive enlargement of 
the scope of the prohibition of non-mainstream individual reli-
gious symbols from a specific context to a general public space us-
ing the margin of appreciation, often expressing an unfavorable 
view of the Islamic symbols worn by Muslim women.148  Second, in 
its opinions that have dealt with mainstream symbols (e.g., the 
crucifix in the Lautsi Grand Chamber judgment) and non-
mainstream symbols (Islamic ones in particular), the Court has re-
lied upon various sociological and theological analyses, and trans-
lated these into a language of standards of pluralism, neutrality, 
equality, and toleration, a language that, as critics have argued, 
seems unsubstantiated and vacuous,149 and lacking in procedural 
fairness towards individual applicants.150 
                                                   
147  See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputa-
tional Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 647–49 (1998) (discussing how sudden social 
shocks in the previously peaceful and relatively unified society of former Yugo-
slavia provoked large-scale social segregation along ethnic lines).  
148  Steinbach, supra note 9, at 51; Cebada Alicia Romero, The European Court 
of Human Rights and Religion: Between Christian Neutrality and the Fear of Islam, 11 
N.Z. J. PUB. INT’L L. 75, 94–100 (2013). 
149  For a critique of Court’s arguments in cases involving Islamic symbols, see 
Rorive, supra note 5, at 2684 and accompanying footnotes.  See also Fish, supra note 
71 (commenting on the Court’s Lautsi Grand Chamber decision and noting that 
the judgment rests not only on the unpersuasive argument that removing cruci-
fixes from classrooms would diminish diversity and tolerance, but also on “the 
plausible-but-flawed argument (the crucifix is a symbol of democracy and nation-
al unity), the bizarre argument (the crucifix is a symbol of Christianity, but Chris-
tianity is not a religion), the theoretical-and-therefore-irrelevant argument (a cru-
cifix can mean many things) and the empirically unpersuasive argument (because 
crucifixes don’t come with voice boxes, they communicate no active message).”). 
150  See Eva Brems & Laurens Lavrysen, Procedural Justice in Human Rights Ad-
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These criticisms appear correct, but their implications are lim-
ited.  The long-term status of the Court is not dependent on adher-
ence to procedural fairness (which affects and is relevant only for 
individuals), but on the acquiescence of high-status states and 
mainstream social norms (a benchmark for measuring social dis-
tance of a religious symbol), both of which affect the Court’s au-
thoritative status.  Simply put, it has thus far been beneficial and 
affordable for the Court to resort to the margin of appreciation and 
describe Christian symbols as passive and aligned with values of 
secularism and diversity while interpreting Islamic symbols as il-
liberal and insufficiently contained, as the Court has sensed that a 
majority of its primary audience among the high-status states and 
wider public feels the same.151 
The motivation for this behavior of the Court is not some “hid-
den anti-Muslim bias,” but rather the Court’s own status concerns 
that vary with and depend upon the wider relevance of the issue at 
stake, and the norms and the composition of its primary audience.  
To illustrate variance, consider the case I.A. v. Turkey.  There, 
somewhat paradoxically given its opinion in Sahin (connecting Is-
lamic religious symbols with extremist movements in Turkey) and 
an otherwise strong protection of the freedom of expression, the 
Court relied on the margin of appreciation to acquiesce in the crim-
inal conviction of a writer whose publications the Turkish authori-
ties deemed to be insulting to Islamic traditions and beliefs.152 
                                                   
judication: The European Court of Human Rights, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 176, 186–87 (2013) 
(discussing the Court’s neutrality and its characteristics transparency, accuracy 
and correctability).  
151  See Christoph Engel, Law as a Precondition for Religious Freedom, MPI 
COLLECTIVE GOODS REPRINT NO. 2011/6 14 (2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1803254 [https://perma.cc/S7BF-YHNM] (stat-
ing that tolerance toward particular religions increases proportionally with their 
level of social (self-)containment).  In a sense, the Court’s margin of appreciation 
is a tool for recognizing and dealing with the variance in the degree of toleration 
and self-containment that different communities and religions exhibit over time. 
152  I.A. v. Turkey, App. No. 42571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-70113”]} 
[https://perma.cc/B32K-FXF5].  Though the judgment in I.A. v. Turkey was con-
sistent with the Court’s case law on the protection of religious sensitivities from 
gratuitously offensive and profane expression (see id. para. 24), as a matter of 
principle its outcome stands in stark contrast to, for example, the case Gündüz v. 
Turkey, App. No. 35071/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61522 [https://perma.cc/W5KT-R9T2] 
(holding that a religious leader’s freedom of expression was violated when Turk-
ish authorities convicted him for using a popular live TV broadcast to criticize the 
government, publicly insult children born outside of marriage, and propose the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1
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In other words, the Court uses the margin of appreciation to 
implicitly incorporate a relativistic status-based view of states and 
societies, a view according to which society (both international and 
national) consists of separate “communities of consents” with dif-
ferentiated social standing based on perceived social and religious 
characteristics that determine and condition capacity for the re-
spect of human rights.  While the margin of appreciation necessari-
ly implies some degree of healthy relativism (or realistic universal-
ism) that results in variation in treatment due to the different social 
backgrounds and considerations,153 in its past judgments on reli-
gious symbols in different states, the Court has arguably over-
stepped its limits in terms of this relativism, and unnecessarily so. 
The fact that the Court relies on a relativistic status-based 
treatment of states and different religions might be neither surpris-
ing nor a result of the Court’s own making.  The drafters of the 
Convention saw the Court primarily as an instrument of external 
democratization of low-status states, probably labored under as-
sumption of relative cultural homogeneity, and did not envision 
that the Court would have to deal with changes of social norms re-
sulting from the increase of pluralism in high-status states.154  The 
Court, in other words, has been building on cultural presupposi-
tions and assumptions of homogeneity which it itself did not cre-
ate.155  If, as it is often argued, cultural homogeneity is one of the 
                                                   
introduction of Sharia law).   
153  For an argument that the oft-repeated charge that relativism is a cause 
behind the margin of appreciation rests on a simplistic and unreal understanding 
of universality, see McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 37, 53.  See generally James A. 
Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 459 (2005) (arguing that 
the application of the margin of appreciation implies some, but not full, relativ-
ism). 
154  See LORD WOOLF, REVIEW OF THE WORKING METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (2005), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Lord%20Woolf-2005-EN1587818.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/J8UJ-Q883] (noting that the Convention was conceived as “an 
early warning system to prevent states from lapsing into totalitarianism.  It set out 
the fundamental rights and freedoms that states should secure to everyone in 
their jurisdiction, and provided a judicial enforcement system—the European 
Court of Human Rights—by which states which violated human rights could be 
called to account.”).  See also Madsen, supra note 19, at 142–43 (discussing the his-
torical trajectory of the Court in response to changes in political situations and in-
creases in democratization).  
155  Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s hypothesis is that the free, liberal, and 
democratic state rests on assumptions that it itself cannot deliver.  In essence, the 
hypothesis implies that underlying secularized Western Christian values spread 
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prerequisites for effective transnational human rights adjudica-
tion,156 a contemporary withering away of (religious) homogeneity 
could spell further deepening of the divide between the two (or 
multiple) tracks of the margin of appreciation developed for differ-
ent states and religious symbols (and religions more generally), 
tracks that will make the Court less useful for individuals but more 
useful for selected CoE states.157  This might harm the status of the 
Court within certain sectors of society, and perhaps among a num-
ber of states.  However, the damage to the status of the Court is un-
likely to be a mortal blow, since courts have an influence over so-
cial life so long as social actors behave as if they matter.158 
 
                                                   
across a relatively homogenous society are necessary for the institutional existence 
of a liberal and pluralistic state.  See ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, STAAT, 
GESELLSCHAFT, FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR STAATSTHEORIE UND ZUM VERFASSUNGSRECHT 
60 (1976) cited in Ladeur, supra note 141, at 2454 n.41.  For further discussion of 
Böckenförde’s hypothesis, see Asim Jusić, Actionable Pluralism and Toleration in Re-
ligiously Diverse Societies: For Whom and for What?, CEDAR (2015), 
http://www.cedarnetwork.org/2015/04/18/2014-cedar-occasional-paper-no-7-
by-asim-jusic/ [https://perma.cc/M4AZ-RML7]. 
156  See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 64, at 335–36, nn.265–67 (discussing lit-
erature that argues that the relative cultural and political homogeneity of states 
positively affects the influence of supranational human rights tribunals such as 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights). 
157  Proposals for differentiated approach to states based on the respective 
differences in the quality of their judicial and legal systems have already been ad-
vanced.  See Helen Keller et al., Debating the Future of the European Court of Human 
Rights after the Interlaken Conference: Two Innovative Proposals, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
1025, 1044 (2010) (arguing that there is a need for a formalization of the system of 
relative, rather than absolute, sovereign equality of states in order to preserve the 
goals of the Convention).  Protocol 15 to the Convention (not yet in force) seeks to 
entrench the margin of appreciation directly into the Convention’s Preamble, and, 
in doing so, set more explicit boundaries for the Court.  Protocol No. 15 Amend-
ing the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, TREATY OFFICE (2013), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/-/conventions/treaty/213 [https://perma.cc/BAM3-DUZU].  For further 
discussion, see Sanader, supra note 69, at 203. 
158  See JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT 17 (1987) (describing how po-
litical, social, and other institutions share a capacity to order social life because 
people act as if they exist and matter).  Similar to Brigham, Madsen notes that 
notwithstanding the challenges to the Court’s authority and the low level of com-
pliance with its decisions in Turkey, “the fact that so many cases are directed to 
Strasbourg suggests conversely the emergence of a legal field in which the Euro-
pean Convention and the ECtHR are increasingly accepted among many audienc-
es as a tool for legal and social change even though some government agents con-
tinue to resist it.”  Madsen, supra note 19, at 164.  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis of the Court’s case law on religious symbols 
shows that even judicial doctrines of self-restraint such as the mar-
gin of appreciation can be used by the various constituencies and 
states for purpose of mobilizations that result in adverse effects (as 
in the cases of Sahin and SAS).  At the same time, even the Court’s 
rare activist decisions, such as Lautsi I, can result in a backlash.159  
In short, the Court is “damned if it doesn’t, and damned if it does”:  
both its restrained and more activist decisions can do more harm 
than good, inflaming what are controllable low-intensity social 
tensions, and create troubles where none initially existed. 
This certainly does not imply that the Court’s decisions on reli-
gious symbols always act as a trigger for such mobilizations.  It 
simply means that, ironically, it might have been better had many 
of the cases discussed in this article never been directed to the 
Court in the first place.  The Court, unable to entirely avoid these 
issues, relied upon theoretical sociological and theological argu-
ments to portray something that is, or was, already practically set-
tled or was best left unresolved as an intractable conflict.  The theo-
ry then became a self-fulfilling prophecy that exacerbated 
controllable social tensions.   
This is an unfortunate outcome that should have been avoided 
not only by the Court, but also by the parties involved in these cas-
es.  Simply put, no one should be terribly impressed by either the 
presence or absence of crucifixes and teachers and students with 
headscarves in schools, or veiled women in the streets.  Converse-
ly, at times, individuals and institutions need to consciously ab-
stain from gratuitously flaunting their identities through symbols, 
as living in diverse yet stable societies requires shouldering the 
costs of self-censorship.  The sky will not fall in if this price is paid, 
but many will be spared unnecessary troubles. 
Quarrels caused by the presence of various religious symbols 
in the public space will persist, and the Court will be invited to de-
cide upon some of these in the future.  At their core, disputes over 
                                                   
159  Activist decisions of the national courts tend to have unforeseen backlash 
effects and, in the process, harm those they were meant to help.  See generally 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (abridged ed. 2007) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education resulted 
in a backlash that effectively worsened the social position of African-Americans in 
the American South, which, in turn, led to national civil rights legislation).  
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headscarves, turbans, crucifixes and burqas in schools, the work-
place and public spaces across Europe are but minor symptoms of 
the growing anxieties over institutional and social willingness and 
capabilities for managing a continuously increasing and likely ir-
reversible religious diversity.  Historically, Europeans have hardly 
been gentle with one another when settling religious differences,160 
and since European democracies represent the social norms of past 
generations, they are ill-equipped to deal with social and demo-
graphic change.161  This analysis suggests that international human 
rights tribunals, like the Court, face an identical problem, and are 
even less willing and well-equipped to deal with such phenomena. 
 
                                                   
160  See Petty, supra note 2, at 807 (discussing the history of European religious 
conflicts).  
161  See Stephen Holmes, Goodbye Future?, EUROZINE (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/article_2012-11-21-holmes-
en.html#footNote4 [https://perma.cc/MA6P-GWY3] (reexamining some aspects 
of the disappointments of democracy after communism in the context of the re-
cent increase in global dissatisfaction with democracy). 
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